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Most theoretical and empirical work on consumption, labor supply and saving decisions has
been based on the paradigm that households behave as single agents. While this approach
is often convenient, it relies on very restrictive assumptions. In recent years, there has been
signicant progress in developing a more satisfactory theory of decision making within house-
holds. The main contribution of this thesis is to explore the signicance of intrahousehold risk
sharing in the presence of uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk. If individuals are unable to rely on
complete asset markets, the extent to which they can cope with uncertainty crucially hinges
on the set of risk sharing channels. Despite its vast empirical signicance, insurance from the
family as one of these channels has mostly been overlooked in the literature.
The rst chapter investigates the signicance of family insurance for savings and labor supply.
An economy in which individuals can share risk within households generates aggregate pre-
cautionary savings that are substantialy smaller than in a similar economy that lacks access to
insurance from the family. Intrahousehold risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-
poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across
unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. The second chap-
ter documents some stylized facts for the distributions of earnings and wealth across single
and married households and presents a theoretical framework that can successfully account
for the data. Assortative matching, the eective tax bonus for married couple and directed
bequests are found to be key determinants for higher per-capita earnings and net worth among
married individuals. The third chapter explores how intrahousehold insurance interacts with
the design of unemployment benet programs. My ndings indicate that scal policy can take
very distinct eects depending on whether intra-household risk sharing is available or not. I
also nd potential eciency gains from gender-based taxation.
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Over the last decades, most theoretical and empirical work on consumption, labor supply and
saving decisions has been based on the paradigm that households behave as single agents.
While this approach is often convenient and has led to many valuable insights, it relies on
very restrictive assumptions. In recent years, there has been signicant progress in developing
a more satisfactory theory of decision making within households. Describing the allocation
process within the family such that it captures aspects of cooperation, conicts and insurance
is not only crucial for understanding consumption, labor supply and saving decisions. At the
same time, it has important implications for policy design. A careful evaluation of the theory
and its consistency with key empirical facts is therefore indispensable.
The thesis at hand contributes to this strand of research by exploring the signicance of in-
trahousehold risk sharing in the presence of uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk. There is ample
evidence that the benchmark assumption of asset market completeness does not merit empir-
ical justication. This observation has led to the development of a new generation of dynamic
general equilibrium models featuring incomplete asset markets and household heterogeneity.
At the heart of these models lies the central question of how well individuals can cope with
uncertainty if they cannot fully rely on private insurance markets. The answer to this question
crucially hinges on the set of risk sharing channels individuals have at their disposal. Despite
its vast empirical signicance, insurance from the family as one of these channels has mostly
been overlooked in the literature. The unifying theme of this work is to shed more light on
the way risk sharing within households shapes individual and aggregate outcomes.
The rst chapter, a joint project with Salvador Ortigueira, investigates the signicance of
family insurance for savings and labor supply. We present a model where workers (females
and males) are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are in-
complete. A household is formed by a female and a male, who make collective decisions on
consumption, savings and labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model, we nd that
precautionary savings are only 55% of those generated by a similar economy that lacks access
to insurance from the family. We also nd that intrahousehold risk sharing has its largest
impact among wealth-poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth
consumption across unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor sup-
ply. For instance, in the group of households with wealth less than two months worth of
income, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those
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family income. We also nd crowding out eects of public unemployment insurance that are
comparable to those estimated from the data.
The second chapter shifts the focus to the foundations of cross-sectional inequality. Most
existing theories of inequality ignore the role of the family, even though marriage appears
to be one of the most important determinants of economic prosperity. I document that the
disaggregated distributions of earnings, income and wealth across single households dier
substantially from those of married households. Most strikingly, married people have on
average 50 percent higher labor earnings, and they hold 34 percent more net worth. To account
for these empirical facts, I develop a theory based on an otherwise standard incomplete-
markets OLG model with ex-ante identical agents, who (i) are randomly selected into single
or married households at the beginning of their economic life; (ii) face uninsurable labor
market risk henceforth; (iii) and make collective decisions if married. In a calibrated version
of the model, I show that positive assortative matching, the eective tax bonus for married
couple and directed bequests are the key determinants for married households' higher average
earnings and wealth. I also assess the implications of a policy reform that abolishes the
possibility to le taxes jointly for married couples. My ndings indicate considerable welfare
gains associated with this reform.
The third chapter explores how intrahousehold insurance interacts with the design of unem-
ployment benet programs. Private risk-sharing agreements within the household, e.g. in
families with multiple income earners, can crucially aect the trade-o between public risk
sharing and distortionary taxation. In an economy with female and male workers who face
uninsurable employment risk, I evaluate the implications of various reforms to the unemploy-
ment insurance schedule. In order to assess the role of family insurance, I study two polar
cases: one economy in which family insurance is available, and one in which it is not. I nd
that scal policy can take very distinct eects across the two economies. For instance, a
more generous benet program favors males and implies welfare losses for females if family
insurance is available; if not, the opposite is true. Lending support to a recent debate, my
ndings also indicate eciency gains from gender-based taxation.
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How important is Intrahousehold
Risk Sharing for Savings and Labor
Supply?
(with Salvador Ortigueira)
Keywords: Intrahousehold risk sharing; Collective household model; Idiosyncratic unemploy-
ment risk; Incomplete markets; Precautionary motive.
JEL Classi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1.1 Introduction
The lack of a formal, private insurance market against employment risk makes this type
of risk dierent from most of others faced by individuals. Even though public, compulsory
unemployment insurance schemes are present in many countries, they typically fall short of
providing full insurance and workers must rely on self-insurance and on informal insurance
mechanisms in order to smooth consumption across unemployment spells. Precautionary
savings and labor supply are the two instruments individuals can use as self-insurance against
employment risk. The family, on the other hand, is the main informal insurance mechanism
available to individuals, with the standard argument being that information and payment
enforceability are better within than between households.1
In this paper, we present an incomplete markets economy with idiosyncratic employment risk
1Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) estimate the degree of consumption insurance from U.S. data and
nd evidence that the family plays an important insurance role.
1
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and assess quantitatively the role of the family as provider of insurance. Intrahousehold risk
sharing, more than any other informal insurance mechanism, has important behavioral impli-
cations that aect not only the demand of self insurance, but also how this is crowded out by
public insurance programs. Indeed, recent empirical evidence on patterns of insurance against
employment risk found in a large panel of U.S. households sheds light on these crowding out
eects. More specically, Cullen and Gruber (2000) and Engen and Gruber (2001) estimate
the response in two forms of insurance |accumulation of nancial assets and spousal labor
supply| to changes in the generosity of unemployment benets and nd signicant crowding
out eects on both. The extent to which public insurance crowds out other forms of (private)
insurance is of paramount importance for public policy assessment [see, e.g., Attanasio and
Rios-Rull (2000), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Chetty
and Saez (2010) for analyses on the optimal level of social insurance when other forms of
private insurance are also available.]
The model economy we present in this paper consists of a large number of two-person house-
holds, each pooling risks and making collective decisions on individual consumptions, labor
supplies and joint savings in a risk-free asset, subject to a borrowing constraint. The two
persons forming a household, a female and a male, are assumed to have dierent individual
preferences for risk and dierent elasticities of labor supply. Individual weights in the house-
hold's utility function are determined, among other variables, by their relative earning ability.
There is a rms sector producing an homogeneous good with capital and labor services, and
a government providing public unemployment insurance. In order to assess the consequences
of within-household risk sharing, the equilibrium in this economy is then compared to that
arising in an economy where individuals lack access to insurance from the family and are left
with self-insurance and public benets as their only instruments to cope with employment
risk. This latter framework corresponds to a standard Aiyagari-Huggett economy augmented
with a labor-leisure choice, which has been studied by, e.g., Flod en and Lind e (2001), Marcet,
Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007) and Pijoan-Mas (2006), among others.
Since the equilibrium of our model economy contains a distribution of households over -
nancial assets and spouses' employment status, we can assess not only the average eects of
intrahousehold risk sharing but also its eects for dierent groups of households. Thus, in
a calibrated version of our model we nd that precautionary savings are only 55% of those
generated by a similar economy that lacks access to insurance from the family. This is a large
drop in precautionary savings that should be taken into account when assessing the ability
of general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic income risk to generate large volumes of
precautionary savings (see, e.g., D az, Pijoan-Mas and R os-Rull 2003 for a discussion on the
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extent of precautionary savings in these models).
We also nd that intrahousehold risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor house-
holds. While the wealth rich use savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells,
wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, in the group of households
with wealth less than two months worth of income, average hours worked by wives of unem-
ployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. Moreover,
this response in wives' hours makes up 9% of lost family income.
The crowding out eects of public unemployment insurance in our calibrated economy are
comparable to those found in the data. On the contrary, the standard Aiyagari-Huggett
model of self insurance over-predicts the response in savings to changes in public insurance by
a large margin. For example, this model predicts an elasticity of asset holdings with respect
to unemployment benets that is almost four times the elasticity estimated by Engen and
Gruber (2001). As should be apparent, the Aiyagari-Huggett model cannot account either for
the crowding out eects of unemployment benets on spousal labor supply. Hence, models
that abstract from risk sharing at the level of the household introduce an important bias
both in the extent of the precautionary motive in the face of unemployment risk and in the
distortionary eects of public insurance programs on savings and labor supply.
There is a vast literature, both empirical and theoretical, assessing the eects of idiosyncratic
income risk on consumption, labor supply and savings. With only few exceptions, this liter-
ature adopts the bachelor household formulation in order to measure individual responses to
income shocks and the degree of endogenous self-insurance. A recent example of this type of
exercise is the paper by Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2008). These authors assume that indi-
viduals (they focus only on males) are subject to a rich array of idiosyncratic shocks, including
productivity and employment shocks. These shocks are assumed to dier in their available
insurance opportunities (employment shocks are partially insured by the public unemploy-
ment insurance system while productivity shocks are not). The authors then use a bachelor
household model to measure the eects of these shocks and the individual willingness to pay
to avoid them. Since they consider endogenous mobility choices, their paper extends previ-
ous results in the literature by adding a new channel from shocks to individual responses to
shocks.
Kotliko and Spivak (1981) is one of the rst papers in economics to study the family as a
provider of insurance to its members. In particular, they present a model where the only risk
is that of unexpected longevity. Their model abstracts from labor earnings and assumes that
an initial level of wealth is the only source of resources available to consumers. They show that
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ecient risk-sharing within the family closes much of the utility gap between no annuities and
complete annuities. For example, the utility gain of marriage at age 30 is about 50% of the
utility gain of an annuities market. In a model with these ingredients, Kotliko, Shoven and
Spivak (1986) study precautionary savings arising from longevity risk. They compare savings
under perfect insurance markets with savings under intrahousehold risk sharing. They nd
signicant dierences in savings.
A more recent exception to the use of the bachelor household formulation is the work of
Attanasio, Low and S anchez-Marcos (2005), who present a partial equilibrium model with
a two-person unitary household to assess the response of female labor market participation
(extensive margin) to idiosyncratic earnings risk within the family. In their model, male
participation is exogenous. An important feature of this model is the process of female
human capital formation, which is assumed to depend on labor market participation. The
authors nd that the higher the uncertainty the higher female participation. They also nd
that the welfare cost of uncertainty is lower when households can adjust female labor market
participation.
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010) also use a two-person, unitary household model
to study the welfare implications of the observed changes in the U.S. wage structure. In
particular, they present an incomplete-markets, life-cycle model to quantify the eects of the
rising college premium, the narrowing wage gender gap and the increasing wage volatility.
Their model allows for an endogenous education choice and for a process matching females
and males into households. Even though the welfare consequences of the above-mentioned
changes in wages are highly heterogenous across dierent types of households, they nd that,
on average, recent cohorts of households enjoy welfare gains, as the new structure of wages
translates into higher educational attainment.
Unitary models of the household, however, assume a utility function for the household and
are thus silent about the decision process between its members. The collective model (see
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene 2006 for a formal denition of this model) establishes in-
stead that this decision process leads to within-household Pareto optimality and that Pareto
weights on individuals' private utility functions depend on prices, policy variables and dis-
tribution factors. Thus, in this latter model, changes in the wage gender gap, in public
unemployment benets and/or in tax rates imply within-household distributional eects that
unitary models fail to capture. Moreover, in economies with idiosyncratic risks and incom-
plete asset markets, these eects, along with heterogeneity in individuals' risk preferences,
have sizable implications for precautionary savings and labor supplies. Consequently, the two
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/321621.2. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 5
models of the household predict dierent crowding out eects of public unemployment insur-
ance. Tests of these two competing models of the household have been carried out by, e.g.,
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998), who nd evidence against the
unitary model. In particular, they reject the income pooling restrictions and the symmetry
of cross-wage eects which are embodied in this model.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic en-
vironment and presents the problems solved by the bachelor and the collective household.
Section 3 denes a stationary equilibrium with incomplete markets in the collective house-
hold economy. It also presents the parameterization and calibration of this economy; it shows
the steady-state equilibrium and discusses some features of the policy functions. Section 4
presents the main results on the aggregate and individual consequences of intrahousehold risk
sharing. Section 5 concludes. The paper contains four appendices.
1.2 The Economic Environment
Consumers The economy is populated by a continuum of measure two of innitely-lived
workers/consumers. Half of this population of workers/consumers will be referred to as fe-
males, and the other half as males. All enjoy the consumption of an aggregate good and of
leisure time (with possibly dierent utility functions). Agents supply time to work in the
production sector and face idiosyncratic labor market risk in the form of employment shocks.
Employment shocks, s, take on values in S  f0;1g and follow a Markov chain with transition
matrix i, where superscript i denotes the gender: females (f) and males (m). Thus, i
s0js is
the probability for an agent of gender i to receive employment shock s0 tomorrow conditional
on employment shock s today, for i = f;m. These probabilities satisfy
P
s0 i




1j0 for i = f;m. The long-run probabilities of the two employment shocks in S
are denoted by qi
0 and qi
1. There are no others shocks in the economy.
Markets are incomplete. The only asset in the economy is a non-state contingent asset that
pays the risk-free interest rate r. Moreover, there is a minimum level of asset holdings, a,
which is a borrowing or liquidity constraint.





tUi(ct;lt); for i = f;m; (1.2.1)
where ct denotes consumption and lt is leisure. We make the following assumptions on Ui:
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A1. Utility Ui(c;l) : R+  [0;1] ! R is bounded, continuous and twice continuously
dierentiable in the interior of its domain.
A2. Utility is separable in consumption and leisure.
A3. Utility Ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each of its arguments. More-
over,
limc!0 Ui
c(c;l) = +1, and liml!0 Ui
l(c;l) = +1.
Firms Production of the aggregate good is conducted by competitive rms. Production
technology is represented by the neoclassical production function F(K;L), where K is the
aggregate stock of capital and L is aggregate labor. The depreciation rate of capital is denoted
by  > 0. Throughout the paper, we will assume the standard Cobb-Douglas production
function, F(K;L) = KL1 , where 0 <  < 1 is the capital's share of income and L 
Lm + (1   )Lf. That is, female and male labor are perfect substitutes and parameter
0 <  < 1 pins down relative, gross-of-taxes wages. The rm's maximization problem is
static: given a rental price of capital r and gross wages for females and males  wf and  wm,
respectively, rst-order conditions are:
FK(K;L) = r +  (1.2.2)
FL(K;L) =  wm (1.2.3)
(1   )FL(K;L) =  wf: (1.2.4)
Government There is a government that provides public insurance against unemployment
shocks. The government pays out benets bi to unemployed workers of gender i = f;m.
Only workers who receive an unemployment shock are entitled to benet payments. The
government nances its expenditures by levying linear taxes on labor income: given tax rates
i, we will denote after-tax wage rates by wi = (1   i)  wi. The government is required to
balance its budget on a period-by-period basis.
1.2.1 The Bachelor versus the Collective Household Model
We now consider two dierent risk-sharing arrangements and study their implications for
labor supply (of both females and males) and for precautionary savings. Each arrangement
denes in turn a dierent type of household. We start out by presenting the problem of
the bachelor household. This is the denition of the household that has dominated not only
the literature on precautionary savings, but also most of the macroeconomic literature. The
dening feature of this type of household is that a single breadwinner chooses sequences of
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consumption, leisure and asset holdings in order to maximize his/her own lifetime utility. In
most studies adopting this framework, the income process is estimated using data on males.
The second type of household we study is a dynamic version of the collective household model
pioneered by Chiappori (1988). In this latter case, we assume that two adult individuals, with
possibly dierent preferences, wages and unemployment risk, form a household and then make
collective decisions on consumptions, labor supplies and savings. In order to understand the
consequences of intrahousehold risk sharing we compare allocations generated by this latter
model with those emerging under the bachelor formulation.
Bachelor Households











s.t. c + a0 = wi(1   l)s + (1   s)bi + (1 + r)a (1.2.6)
c  0; 0  l  1; and a0 2 [ai; a]; (1.2.7)
where i
s0js are the elements of i. The minimum level of assets this agent can hold is denoted
by ai. A version of this model where there is a measure one of same-gender workers is the
workhorse model in the literature of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, precautionary savings and
labor supply (see, e.g., Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil 2007). Flod en and Lind e (2001) and
Pijon-Mas (2006) also study a model with a measure one of same-gender, bachelor households
where workers receive idiosyncratic shocks to the eciency units of labor supply, instead of
an employment/unemployment shock.
By construction, the bachelor household does not engage in informal insurance arrangements
with other workers. The only sources of insurance available to this type of household are the
public unemployment insurance system, own savings and own labor supply.
Collective Households
We now consider two-person, collective households formed by an egotistical female and an
egotistical male. We assume that the two members of the household share labor market risk
in such a way that intrahousehold allocations are ecient.2 Following the literature of col-
lective households (see Chiappori and Donni 2010 for a recent survey), the utility of each
2It should be noted, however, that in two-person households the number of family members involved in risk
pooling is too small to achieve full insurance against labor market risk.
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individual in the household carries a weight, reecting the relative power of that individual
in the household. Individual weights are assumed to depend on variables such as premarital
wealth, the population sex ratio, relative earnings and government policy. Under full com-
mitment, that is, when household members can commit to future intrahousehold allocations,
individual weights are set when the household is formed and remain unchanged thereafter.
Thus, transitory shocks, which are small relative to lifetime income, have no eect on individ-
ual weights. Only variables known or predicted at the time of household formation can aect
those weights.3 In our model there are four sources of earning dierences between females and
males that aect relative Pareto weights: 1) They have dierent gross wages; 2) They may
pay dierent tax rates; 3) They may receive dierent levels of unemployment benets; and, 4)
Finally, females and males may be subject to dierent employment and unemployment spells.
We write the Pareto weight on female's utility as (x;z) 2 (0;1), where function  is assumed
to be dierentiable with respect to its rst argument. Variable x is a measure of the relative












i for j = f;m and i = 0;1 is, as written above, the long-run probability of employment
state i for an agent of gender j. Vector z includes variables such as the population sex ratio,
the initial contribution to household wealth, etc., which we do not model explicitly in this
paper. It must be noted that in our model the Pareto weight function, (x;z), is not obtained
as the outcome of an explicit bargaining process between females and males. Instead, we will
use estimates of the sharing rule provided by Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene
(1994) to parameterize and solve our model.4
Household-level state variables for the two-person, collective household are the vector of em-
ployment shocks s = (sf;sm), which we assume to be uncorrelated within the household,5
and the level of asset holdings, a. The state space of a household is X = S  S  [a; a]. We
denote by B the Borel sigma algebra of X. The transition matrix for s is denoted by  and
obtained from the individual transition matrices as  = m 
 f. The vector of after-tax
wages for the household, (wf;wm), is denoted by w.
3For a test of intrahousehold commitment to future allocations, see Mazzocco (2007). Using data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey, this author rejects the hypothesis of commitment. Since our model abstracts
from permanent shocks and assumes only transitory shocks to labor income, we will retain, for the sake of
analytical tractability, the assumption of commitment.
4In a recent paper Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009) endogenize the Pareto weight as the solution
to a symmetric Nash bargaining problem within the household.
5We will discuss further this independence assumption below.
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The maximization problem of a collective household with Pareto weight (x;z) on female's
utility is
V (s;a;x;z;r) = max
cf;cm;lf;lm;a0
(








cf + cm + a0 =
X
i=f;m
wi(1   li)si +
X
i=f;m
(1   si)bi + (1 + r)a(1.2.10)
cf;cm  0; 0  lf;lm  1; and a0 2 [a; a]; (1.2.11)
where s0js are the elements of . Note that while we allow for dierent preferences over
consumption and leisure for females and males, we assume that both spouses share a common
discount factor . In our model, z is the only source of variation in Pareto weights across
households. We represent the distribution of these weights in the population of households
by G(). The support of this distribution is denoted by M  (0;1).
Contrary to unitary models of the household, the utility function of the collective household
depends, via the Pareto weight, on wages and policy variables, which leads to household
demands that fail to meet the Slutsky conditions. This failure is the dening feature of the
collective model. Also, while in unitary models household decisions do not depend on who
receives the income within the household, in our collective model decisions depend on total
income as well as on who receives the income (whether it is the female or the male).
The dependency of the household's utility function on prices and policy must also be acknowl-
edged when setting the Frisch elasticities of labor supply for females and males. In particular,
these elasticities are functions of the derivative of the Pareto weight with respect to wages.
Our assumption that both labor supplies can vary continuously in response to wages and non-
labor income is common in the literature of collective labor supply [see, e.g., Chiappori (1988)
and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002)].6 Likewise, the household's attitude towards risk
in the collective model depends both on individual preferences and on the relative Pareto
weight. Since we will assume individual preferences which are not of the ISHARA type (i.e.,
household members do not share a common coecient of harmonic risk-aversion), the house-
hold does not behave as a single decision maker, in the sense that an increase in risk aversion
6For a recent study of collective labor supply allowing for non continuity see Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac
and Meghir (2007). These authors present a collective model of the household where the female makes a
continuous labor supply choice but the male decides simply whether or not to participate.
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of one household member does not necessarily increase risk aversion of the household. [For
an analysis of a two-period, collective model of the household with uncertainty see Mazzocco
(2004)].
It should be noted that our assumption of egoistical preferences is not crucial. Actually,
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006) show that under caring preferences of the form where
female's instantaneous utility is Uf(cf;lf)+ fUm(cm;lm) and male's utility is Um(cm;lm)+
 mUf(cf;lf), with 0 <  f; m  1 denoting the caring parameters, the utility function
of the household can be written down as for the case of egotistical preferences, after a re-
denition of Pareto weights. The new relative weight on female's utility Uf(cf;lf) would be
^   ( + (1   ) m)=(1 +  f + (1   ) m). Note that this weight converges to 0:5 as  f
and  m converge to 1, for all values of .
We now present the rst-order conditions to the maximization problem (2.9)-(2.11). As
explained above, the collective model of the household implies full risk-sharing within the
household, i.e., the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption equals relative Pareto weights
and is thus independent of the realized vector of employment shocks. That is,
Uf
c = (1   )Um
c : (1.2.12)
This equation denes the individual risk-sharing rules, which, for a given level of household
consumption, specify how much is consumed by each of its members. It is straightforward
to show that the derivative of the risk-sharing rules is positive and given by the product of
the household's coecient of absolute risk aversion and the individual's coecient of absolute
risk tolerance.7 Therefore, the member of the household showing higher risk tolerance will be
the one absorbing most of the variation in total household consumption. (In Appendix IV we
present the derivatives of the risk-sharing rules for the case of CRRA utility functions.)












 wmsm with inequality if lm = 1: (1.2.14)










7Risk tolerance is dened as the reciprocal of risk aversion.
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The rst-order condition to savings is,
Uf




c if a0 >  a (1.2.16)
Uf




c if a0 = a: (1.2.17)
We can now present some properties of the value function and optimal decision rules for a
household with Pareto weight  2 M. (We present the proofs for the case bf = bm = 0, but
it is straightforward to show that the results hold for the case of positive benets, provided
wili  bi for i = f;m; i.e., earnings are higher than unemployment benets.)
Proposition 1. Assume A1 { A3, w > 0; (1 + r) > 0, (1 + r)  1. Then:
(a) V (s;a;) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in a. Decision rules cf(s;a;),
cm(s;a;), lf(s;a;);lm(s;a;) and a0(s;a;) are continuous in a and strictly pos-
itive.
(b) Decision rules for consumption, cf(s;a;) and cm(s;a;), are strictly increasing in
a. Decision rules for savings, a0(s;a;), and leisure, lf(sf = 1;sm;a;), lm(sm =
1;sf;a;), are increasing in a.
(c) Decision rules for consumption are increasing in the own employment shock: cj(sj =
1;si;a;)  cj(sj = 0;si;a;).
(d) Decision rules for leisure are increasing in the spouse's employment shock: lj(sj =
1;si = 1;a)  lj(sj = 1;si = 0;a;).
(e) If (1 + r)  1, then for all a 2 [a;a], a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a;)  a (with strict
inequality if a < a < a and (1 + r) < 1).
Proof: See the Appendix.
We now present some results on the asymptotic properties of the consumption program,
savings and labor supply of a household with Pareto weight , for dierent values of wages,
(wf;wm), and of the interest rate, r. More specically, we extend results by Marcet, Obiols-
Homs and Weil (2007) for the bachelor household to our two-person, collective household
model. We also extend the results to non-homogeneous utility functions. With this aim,
let us denote by ~ a() the minimum level of asset holdings for which both spouses within a
household with Pareto weight  will stop supplying labor. The value ~ a() is pinned down as
follows. First, since utility is separable in consumption and leisure, we can plug (1.2.12) into
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with inequality if lm = 1: (1.2.19)
Dene e Ui
l as the marginal utility of leisure for individual i = f;m, at li = 1. Also, dene
e Uf


















c (). Let e ci() be the level of consumption for which the corresponding
marginal utility of consumption equals e Ui
c(). Then the level of asset holding ~ a() mentioned





e cf() + e cm()
i
: (1.2.21)
It can easily be checked that at e a(), equations (1.2.10) { (1.2.14) are satised for all possible
realizations of sf and sm if consumption levels equal e cf() and e cm(), hours worked equal
zero and asset holdings remain constant. In the case that (1 + r) = 1, equation (1.2.16) is
satised, because consumption is constant. Hence, if (1 + r) = 1, optimal decision rules are
ci(s;e a();) = e ci() (1.2.22)
li(s;e a();) = 1 (1.2.23)
a0(s;e a();) = e a(); (1.2.24)
for i = f;m and for all s 2 S  S. Thus, if the household ever reaches e a(), it will maintain
a constant consumption stream without ever working. For lower interest rates, constant
consumption does not satisfy the FOC for asset holdings, and the household never reaches
e a(). The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 2: Assume A1 { A3, a > e a(), w > 0 and (1 + r) > 0. Then:
(a) If (1 + r)  1, for any a  e a(), a0(s;a;)  e a().
(b) If (1 + r) = 1, for any a  e a() and any s we have a0(s;a;) = a, lf(s;a;) = 1,
lm(s;a;) = 1 and cf(s;a;) + cm(s;a;) = a r such that U
f
c = (1   ) Um
c .
(c) If (1 + r) = 1 and a  e a(), then at
a:s:  ! e a();ci
t
a:s:  ! e ci(), li
t
a:s:  ! 1; i = f;m.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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It follows that in the case (1 + r) < 1 the household can reach any value of asset holdings
from any initial capital stock in nite time, and a stationary distribution arises in the long
run. Moreover, in the case (1+r) = 1 and a  e a(), capital accumulation in the long run is
bounded and it converges asymptotically to e a(). This is in contrast to the case of inelastic
labor supply where savings asymptotically grow to innity if (1 + r) = 1. As it should be
apparent from these results, the endogenous labor-leisure decision changes the asymptotic
behavior of consumption and assets with respect to the inelastic labor case by removing
income uncertainty. When household wealth is high enough, labor supply equals zero and
thus employment shocks no longer aect household income. Hence, under non-stochastic
income, unbounded asset accumulation is no longer optimal under (1 + r) = 1.
Finally, note that if we set a > max2M e a() and choose initial capital holdings for all
households with relative Pareto weight  such that a0()  e a(), then the upper limit on
capital is never binding. In other words, under these conditions the upper bound on asset
holdings, which was imposed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the value function,
does not bind.
1.3 Stationary Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
We dene now a stationary equilibrium with incomplete markets in the collective household
economy. Let  (B;) be a probability measure describing the mass of households with xed
Pareto weight  at each point in the state space X, where  (B;) is dened on the Borel
sigma algebra B. Denote by P(s;a;B;) the probability that a household with Pareto weight
 at state (s;a) will transit to a state that lies in B 2 B in the next period. The transition





where I is an indicator function taking on a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise,
and Bs and Ba are the projections of B on S  S and [a;a] respectively. Note that these
transition functions will in general dier across households with dierent Pareto weights .
We are now ready to dene the equilibrium concept for our model.
Denition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in the




measure of households   and a set of prices









Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3216214 CHAPTER 1. HOW IMPORTANT IS INTRAHOUSEHOLD [...] ?
1) For given prices, taxes and benets, V is the solution to (1.2.9) { (1.2.11), and cf(s;a;),
cm(s;a;), lf(s;a;mu);lm(s;a;) and a0(s;a;) are the associated optimal policy func-
tions.
2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the rm's rst-order conditions (1.2.2) { (1.2.4).


















sm[1   lm(s;a;)]d dG: (1.3.3)





P(s;a;B;)d  for all B 2 B: (1.3.4)
5) The government budget is balanced: q
f
0bf + qm
0 bm = f  wfLf + m  wmLm.
Under assumptions A1 { A3 the interest rate in the stationary equilibrium under incomplete
markets must be such that (1+r) < 1. This implies that the equilibrium capital-labor ratio
under incomplete markets is higher than under complete markets.
1.3.1 Stationary Equilibrium with Complete Markets
In the complete markets economy households can trade a set of Arrow securities which pay
contingent on the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks of both spouses.8 It is then straightfor-
ward to show that in a stationary equilibrium the interest rate must be such that (1+r) = 1.
In addition, marginal utilities of consumption are equalized across states and periods, which
in conjunction with assumption A2 implies that female and male consumption levels are in-
dependent of the vector of the household's employment shocks s = (sf;sm) and constant over
time. In a stationary equilibrium with complete markets the capital-labor ratio K=L and op-
timal household decision rules are uniquely determined, whereas the absolute values of K and
L are not pinned down: in fact, there are innitely many dierent distributions of households
that generate pairs of aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L which are all consistent
with the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. Hence, when comparing the stationary complete
8See Appendix II for a complete characterization of this economy.
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markets equilibrium with the incomplete markets economy, we must choose an equilibrium
selection mechanism in the complete markets economy. An obvious candidate is the steady
state equilibrium that arises after the transition from the incomplete markets economy. That
is, when markets are completed, we compute the long-run equilibrium using the stationary
equilibrium of the incomplete markets economy as initial conditions.9
1.3.2 Parameterization and Calibration
Parameterization










1   i for i = f;m; (1.3.5)
where 'i
c and 'i
l are parameters ('
f
c is normalized to one) and i is the coecient of relative
risk aversion of an individual of gender i. It must be noted that in the model with collective
households |and contrary to the model with bachelor households| the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply of an individual of gender i depends not only on parameter i, but is also a
function of variables and parameters that aect the expected, intrahousehold earnings dier-
ential through the Pareto weight (see Appendix III for a derivation of Frisch elasticities in
the collective household economy). Also, as anticipated above, a household's risk aversion is
determined by individual preferences for risk and by the household sharing rule . It is only
when the two household members share the same preferences for risk, i.e., f = m, that the
household's coecient of relative risk aversion becomes independent of Pareto weights (see
Appendix IV for a derivation of the household's coecient of risk aversion).
Technology As written above, the production takes place according to the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology, F(K;L) = KL1 , where labor is L  Lm + (1   )Lf. Parameter 
is the capital share of income and  pins down relative gross wages, since wf=wm = (1 )=.
Pareto weights We will make the following simplifying assumption on the distribution of
Pareto weights over the population, G. In our benchmark economy we assume that all house-
holds are ex-ante identical and have a relative Pareto weight equal to 0:5. This amounts to
assuming a degenerate distribution over the vector z so that females and males have a Pareto
weight exactly equal to 0:5 in all households. It should be noted, however, that a Pareto
9Pijoan-Mas (2006) contains a detailed description of the computational algorithm for an Aiyagari-Huggett
economy without public insurance and with ex-ante identical, same-gender individuals.
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weight of 0:5 would endogenously arise under caring preferences of the form discussed above
for high enough caring parameters  f and  m.
We also need the derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to x, 1(x;z), in order
to pin down the Frisch elasticities of labor supply. We will set the value of this derivative using
empirical estimates of the sharing rule. We detail this empirical evidence and our procedure
below.
Parameter Values




l ;f; m; f and m. There are
three technology parameters: ;  and . The two transition matrices f and m contain four
parameters. The parameter a denes the minimum level of asset holdings for any household,
i.e. the borrowing limit. The public insurance program is described by tax rates and the level
of unemployment benets: f;m;bf and bm (one of the tax rates is determined from the
balanced-budget constraint). Finally, we have to pin down the derivative of the Pareto weight
function with respect to x, 1.
The length of a period in the model is set to one quarter. We will normalize '
f
c to 1, which is
equivalent to dividing both instantaneous utility functions by this parameter. The borrowing
limit is set to zero, i.e. households are restricted to hold non-negative asset holdings at all
times. In order to calibrate the remaining parameters we choose a set of statistics from
aggregate and household survey data for the U.S. economy, such that the incomplete markets
equilibrium of our collective household economy matches these targets. Using estimates for
the quarterly capital depreciation rate and the capital share of income, we set  = 0:025 and
 = 0:36, which are both standard values in the macro literature.
In our benchmark economy, we impose equal labor income tax rates for females and males,
f = m. Consequently, the value for  can be pinned down using a priori information on the
gender wage gap. We set this parameter equal to 0:575, which implies a ratio of female to male
wages of 0:74. This corresponds to the gender wage gap in 2004 as reported by Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2010) for the U.S. economy.
Transition probabilities for idiosyncratic employment shocks are assumed to be identical for
females and males. While the female unemployment rate averaged 1:5% percentage points
higher than the male rate during the period 1960-1980, the female-male gap disappeared after
the early 1980's. Even though male unemployment rates generally increase more than female
rates during recessions |mainly due to the fact that men dominate industries like manu-
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facturing and construction| the average dierence between female and male unemployment
rates over the period 1980-2009 is practically zero. Explanations for the narrowing gap in
unemployment rates point to the relative increase of service-oriented industries which employ
a large proportion of women. We use the following transition probabilities which match an






for i = f;m: (1.3.6)
Our assumption that within-household unemployment shocks are uncorrelated can be sup-
ported from SIPP data. Indeed, from the April 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, which covers 48 months between April 1996 and March 2000, it is
possible to compute the within-household unemployment correlation. Since information on
occupation is available in these data, unemployment correlations can be computed both for
households where husband and wife report dierent occupation and for households reporting
the same occupation. Within-household unemployment correlation in the rst group is 0:05,
and 0:23 in the second. It should be noted, however, that the fraction of households reporting
same occupation for husband and wife is only 3:2% of the total. (For a detailed explanation
on the calculation of these correlations, see Shore and Sinai 2010.)
The remaining twelve parameters are set such that our model matches the following targets:
1. Married females' average hours of work if working represent 28% of their discretionary
time. Married males' average hours of work if working represent 40% of their discre-
tionary time.11
2. Estimates for males' Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the presence of potentially
binding borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Domeij and Flod en 2006).
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) nd that for females this elasticity is 3-4 times larger
than for males. We will target values of 0.37 and 1.2 for males and females, respectively.
3. Non-gender-based estimates of the average coecient of relative risk aversion have
yielded values ranging from 1 to 10. When gender is taken into account, females are
10These transition probabilities are similar to the ones used in the previous literature, see e.g. Imrohoroglu
(1989), Krusell and Smith (1998) and Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007).
11Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008) use PSID data from 1968 to 1996 to compute mean annual hours
worked if working for married females and males; he nds values of 1660 and 2312 respectively. We make the
assumption that the disposable daily time endowment is 16 hours.
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found to be more risk-averse than males.12 We set individual preferences for risk at
f = 2 and m = 1:5, which yields an average coecient of relative risk aversion for the
collective household of 1:68.
4. The capital-to-output ratio is around 10.
5. The ratio of annual hours worked by single working women to annual hours worked by
single working men is 1861=2095 = 89 percent.13 We will match this value using the
equilibrium of the bachelor economy.
6. The average net unemployment benet replacement rate in the United States is roughly
30 percent (see OECD 2010). We will set bf and bm to match this target as fractions
of the average wage income both for females and males. Labor income tax rates are set
to balance the budget constraint of the government.
7. The derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to the expected income dif-
ferential, 1, is set to match the sharing rule estimates presented in Browning, Bour-
guignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994).
As for the last target, Browning et al. (1994) use data on couples with no children to estimate
the parameters of the sharing rule: they nd that the wife's share in total expenditure increases
modestly with her share in household income. Specically, increasing the wife's contribution
to household income from 25% to 75% (holding total expenditure constant) raises her share
in total expenditure by about 2:3%. In addition, the impact of total expenditure on the wife's
share is positive and sizable. For instance, an increase in total expenditures (holding her
relative contribution to household income xed) by 60% raises the wife's share by about 12%.
We use these empirical estimates to ascertain the value of 1j=0:5 as follows. Starting from
the benchmark equilibrium and  = 0:5, we increase the value of x | e.g. by raising wf=wm
| and then compute the new Pareto weight, say ~ , such that the implied increase in the
wife's relative contribution to household income yields an increase in the wife's share of total
expenditure, cf=(cf + cm), that matches the one implied by the sharing rule as estimated in
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994).14 Given the imputed value ~ , we
then use a linear approximation to obtain 1j=0:5.
Table 1 presents parameter values for our benchmark economy.
12For a recent study of risk aversion and gender see Maestripieri, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), who nd a
negative relation between testosterone levels and risk aversion.
13See Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008).
14When computing the wife's shares of income and expenditures, we take the average over all households.
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Table 1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Female risk aversion f 2 Utility weight 'f
c 1
Male risk aversion m 1:5 Utility weight 'm
c 2:15
Frisch elasticity f 2 Utility weight '
f
l 2:662
Frisch elasticity m 3:75 Utility weight 'm
l 0:911
Pareto weight  0:5 Discount factor  0:989
Derivative Pareto weight 1 0:038 Unemployment benets bf 0:083
Capital share  0:36 Unemployment benets bm 0:161
Depreciation rate  0:025 Relative wages  0:575
1.3.3 Steady-state Equilibrium
Aggregate variables in the steady-state equilibrium with incomplete markets are presented
in Table 2 below, both for the collective and the bachelor household economies. Note that
the two economies dier only in the insurance opportunities available to individuals, and,
therefore, dierences in aggregates variables reect the equilibrium eects of intrahousehold
risk sharing. Aggregate capital is higher in the bachelor economy, as the lack of insurance
from the family in this economy leads individuals to rely more on savings. Aggregate work
eort by females and males rank dierently in the two economies. While male labor is higher
in the collective economy, females work more in the bachelor economy. In this latter economy,
females are relatively poorer and, since they lack the consumption insurance provided by
the family, must supply more hours of work. On the contrary, males nance part of female
consumption in the collective economy (even with equal Pareto weights) and must therefore
work longer hours. Total labor is higher in the bachelor household economy. We will elaborate
further on this below. The capital-labor ratio is lower in the economy with intrahousehold risk
sharing, yielding a higher interest rate as compared to the economy with bachelor households.
Finally, production is higher in the economy with bachelor households, which results from
larger aggregate capital and labor.
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Table 2. Steady-state equilibrium: Aggregate Variables
Y K L K=L Lf Lm 1 + r
Collective household economy 1:2723 12:6820 0:3490 36:3351 0:2799 0:4001 1:1115
Bachelor household economy 1:3081 13:0410 0:3588 36:3452 0:3363 0:3754 1:1109
Notes: This table presents the steady-state equilibrium with incomplete markets in the economies with
and without intrahousehold risk sharing.
Policy Functions
The relative contribution of households across the wealth and employment distribution to the
dierences in economic aggregates shown in Table 2 are now explored. Labor supply and sav-
ing policy functions of collective households are presented in Figures 1.1 and 3.1, respectively.
The top panel of Figure 1.1 plots hours worked by females and males in households where the
two spouses are employed. Hours decrease with household wealth, and the rate of decline is
higher for females, implying that they work relatively less in asset-rich households. As asset
holdings approach the borrowing limit, policy functions for hours bend upwards, capturing
the fact that asset-poor households use labor supply to smooth consumption more intensively.
Hours worked by females and males when the spouse is unemployed are plotted in the bottom
panel of Figure 1.1 (for convenience, we plot them along with those emerging when the two
spouses are employed). First, hours supplied increase if the spouse is unemployed, both for
females and males, and the increase is especially marked for females in asset-poor households.
For example, a female in a household with no assets will supply almost half of her available
time to work if the spouse is unemployed, as opposed to 0:37 when the spouse is employed,
which represents a decline of more than 25%. We now display the eects of intrahousehold
risk sharing on hours worked at dierent levels of asset holdings and employment shocks.
Figure 2.1 (top panel) plots excess hours worked by two bachelors (each with wealth a=2)
over hours worked by a two-person collective household (with wealth a). For all households
where only the male is employed, intrahousehold risk sharing increases household hours. For
households where the female is employed, with the exception of low-wealth households with
the male unemployed, intrahousehold risk sharing decreases household hours. The bottom
panel of the Figure shows the average of these excess hours across households along the em-
ployment distribution. As it is apparent, the eects of intrahousehold risk sharing on hours
are strongest among wealth-poor households.
Savings policy functions in the collective model are presented in Figure 3.1 (for convenience
we plot the net change in asset holdings a0   a). Households where the two spouses are
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employed choose positive net savings at the borrowing limit and at all values in the support
of the equilibrium distribution of assets. For households with at least one of the spouses
unemployed, net savings are zero at the borrowing limit and negative for a large set of asset
holdings. Negative net savings are larger in households where the male is unemployed. The
saving eects of intrahousehold risk sharing at dierent levels of asset holdings are shown
in Figure 4.1. The top panel of Figure 4.1 plots excess savings of two bachelors (each with
wealth a=2) over a two-person collective household (with wealth a). The bottom panel plots
the average of excess savings across employment shocks. Clearly, although risk sharing aects
the savings decisions of all households across the wealth distribution, its eects are strongest
among wealth-poor households.
1.3.4 Aggregate Precautionary Savings and Precautionary Labor Supply
We now move to assessing the consequences of completing markets, and to how these depend
on the ability to share risks within the family. As already noted, aggregate precaution-
ary savings in our framework are small, regardless of whether intrahousehold risk sharing
is available or not. This is a consequence of our specication of the income process |
employment/unemployment shocks coupled with unemployment benets| which lacks the
necessary persistence to generate large incentives to save for precautionary reasons. However,
a comparison of precautionary savings and work eort across the economies with collective
and bachelor households will help us assess the implications of intrahousehold risk sharing.
In Table 3 we present aggregate precautionary savings and precautionary labor supply in the
collective model relative to those in the bachelor model. That is, we report col:=bach:,
where i for i = col:;bach: denotes precautionary aggregates (savings and work eort) under
households of type i. For our baseline parameter values, precautionary savings |measured
as the fraction of capital held for precautionary motives| in the economy with collective
households represent 55% of those in the economy with bachelor households. That is, access
to insurance from the family reduces aggregate precautionary savings by 45%.
Aggregate precautionary work eort is equally measured by the fraction of hours worked for
precautionary motives, i.e., (LIM   LCM)=LIM, where LIM and LCM denote hours worked
under incomplete and complete markets, respectively. Both for females and males, aggregate
work eort is higher in the complete markets economy, implying negative aggregate precau-
tionary labor under both households arrangements. This is a consequence of an ex-post wealth
eect operating in the incomplete markets economy. That is, conditional on being employed,
individuals work relatively less hours in the incomplete markets economy because the inabil-
ity to buy employment insurance makes them ex-post richer. Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil
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(2007) were the rst to uncover the implications of this ex-post wealth eect for aggregate
precautionary labor in the Aiyagari-Huggett model. In Table 3 we report precautionary labor
in the collective household economy relative to that in the bachelor economy. The percent-
age increase in aggregate female labor resulting from completing markets in the collective
household economy is only 37% of the increase under bachelor households. The increase in
aggregate male labor represents 75% of the increase under bachelor households. That is, the
ex-post wealth eect is weaker in the collective economy.
Table 3. Relative Precautionary Savings and Precautionary Work Eort
K L Lf Lm
col:=bach: 0:5552 0:5586 0:3769 0:7502
Notes: i  1 CMi=IMi for i = col:;bach:; represent the fraction of capital held and hours
worked for precautionary motives in an economy with households of type i. That is, CMi
and IMi refer to aggregates under complete and incomplete markets, respectively. * For the
case of aggregate labor, both col: and bach: are negative. I.e., both in the collective and
the bachelor economies aggregate work eort is higher under complete markets than under
incomplete markets.
1.4 Intrahousehold Risk Sharing and the Crowding-Out Ef-
fects of Unemployment Benets
In our model economy there are two insurance mechanisms |in addition to public unem-
ployment benets| households can use to smooth consumption across unemployment spells:
savings and labor supply. In the economy with intrahousehold risk sharing, spousal labor
supply is a potentially important instrument to smooth consumption upon a spousal's unem-
ployment spell. Changes in the level of public insurance call forth adjustments in the demand
for other forms of insurance. The extent to which the ability to share risks within the house-
hold shapes the crowding out eects of public unemployment insurance is explored in this
section.
1.4.1 Household Financial Assets and the Generosity of Unemployment
Benets
An implication of our model, as of any model with uninsurable income risk, is that house-
hold asset holdings increase with income uncertainty. Engen and Gruber (2001) exploit the
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variation in generosity of unemployment insurance schedules across U.S. states to test this
implication and to estimate the extent of the precautionary savings motive. Since the level of
unemployment benets is directly correlated with household income risk, this variation can
be used to measure the extent to which benets crowd out household nancial assets. These
authors use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) |which fol-
lows a cross section of households over a period of 2:5 years| in combination with data on
unemployment benets available to these households under their state/date benets system.
They regress household nancial assets (normalized by average household income) on the
generosity of benets, controlling for a vector of demographic and economic characteristics
of the household. The elasticity of the average household's nancial assets-to-income ratio
with respect to unemployment benets is  0:28. That is, reducing the replacement rate of
unemployment benets by 50% raises the household's assets-to-income ratio by 14%.
In this subsection, we use our model economy to compute the elasticity of the average assets-
to-income ratio with respect to unemployment benets. The purpose of this exercise is twofold.
On the one hand, we use it as a test for our model with collective households to match this
estimated measure of the precautionary savings motive. On the other hand, we also compute
this elasticity using the bachelor household model and assess by how much it overestimates
the precautionary motive. In this latter model there is no intrahousehold risk sharing and,
therefore, variation in unemployment benets amounts to larger changes in household income
risk and, consequently, to larger eects on savings.
In order to mimic the empirical exercise conducted by Engen and Gruber (2001) we proceed
as follows. Since these authors rely on the exogenous variation in unemployment benets
for workers living in dierent states in the U.S., we interpret the level of unemployment
benets in our benchmark economy as the average value across all states. Then, we vary
these benets and compute asset-to-income ratios by solving the model keeping equilibrium
prices unchanged, a strategy which is in accordance with the existence of a unique nancial
and labor market across states. However, Pareto weights and the distribution of households
over asset holdings are let to change with unemployment benets. Thus, our exercise compares
the dierential asset-to-income ratio of households across states that provide these households
with diering unemployment benets, which is exactly what Engen and Gruber (2001) do in
their empirical work. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4. As shown there, our
collective household model accounts fairly well for the empirical elasticity estimated by Engen
and Gruber (2001). On the contrary, the bachelor household model, which by construction
abstracts from within-household risk sharing, overpredicts this elasticity by a factor of more
than three. The economy with intrahousehold risk sharing yields an elasticity of the asset-
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income ratio of  0:29, against an elasticity of  0:94 in the bachelor household economy.
Intrahousehold risk sharing plays thus a key role in the determination of the elasticity of the
assets-to-income ratio with respect to benets. This is evidence of the importance of this
informal source of insurance when assessing the crowding out eects of public unemployment
insurance.
The success of our collective model at matching this empirical elasticity,  0:29 in the model
against  0:28 in the data, can be interpreted as providing support to the view that the
two-person household embeds the most important informal insurance arrangement available
to individuals. Indeed, some authors have emphasized the irrelevant insurance role played
by the extended family, friends and other social networks (see, e.g., Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston 2008).
Table 4. Unemployment Benets and Financial Assets
Elasticity of average assets-to-income
ratio w.r.t. replacement rate
Data (Engen and Gruber 2001)  0:28
Collective Household Economy  0:29
Bachelor Household Economy  0:94
Notes: This table shows how household asset holdings respond to the generosity of unemployment
benets.
1.4.2 Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance
In the face of unemployment risk and capital market imperfections, spousal labor supply
becomes a potential source of household self-insurance. The change in a household member's
labor supply induced by an unemployment spell of another household member |the added
worker eect| has been largely studied in the empirical literature. Most of this literature
has focused on the labor supply response of married women to their husband's unemployment
spells. The main argument in favor of restricting the attention to labor supply of women is
that they are the secondary wage earners in most households (according to Cullen and Gruber
2000, in 87% of married couples in the U.S. the husband earns more and in 73% the husband
works more hours).
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Early literature on the added worker eect (see Cullen and Gruber 2000 for a short review)
has singled out liquidity constraints as one of the main reasons married women increase hours
worked during their husband's unemployment spells. Empirical estimates have however pro-
duced mixed results, failing to nd strong support for this eect.15 Cullen and Gruber (2000),
using data from the 1984-88 and 1990-92 panels of the Survey of Income Program Participa-
tion for married couples aged between 25 and 54 years old, report means for wives' monthly
hours worked during husbands' spells of employment and unemployment, respectively. Con-
ditional on working women, these authors nd that the average amount of work per month
of wives of unemployed husbands is 149 hours, as opposed to 132.4 hours worked by wives of
employed husbands. When non working wives are included, i.e. those who work 0 hours, the
change in average hours is small: 98:2 hours for wives with an unemployed husband, against
97:9 hours for those with an employed husband.
In this section we use our model economy with collective households to study the response of
female labor supply to male's unemployment spells in two groups of households. In order to
highlight the role of liquidity constraints on wives' labor supply responses, we follow Zeldes
(1989) in dening a household as liquidity constrained if its non-housing wealth is less than
two months of average income. Table 5 below reports the added worker eect in our model
economy. For the group of liquidity-constrained households, average hours worked by wives
of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands, an
increase comparable to that found by Cullen and Gruber (2000) in their sample of working
women. When all households are taken into account the increase in hours is only 0:06%. That
is, spousal labor supply is an important insurance mechanism for wealth-poor households but
not for the wealth rich.
Table 5. Female Labor Supply and Male Employment Status
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Employed Husband 173:1 145:1
Unemployed Husband 187:8 145:9
Notes: This table shows average monthly hours of work by working females in households with em-
ployed and unemployed males in our baseline economy with collective households.
15Stephens (2002) estimates the added worker eect taking into account not only the current period of the
husband's job loss but also the periods before and after a job loss. This author nds small pre-displacement
eects but large, persistent post-displacement eects.
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3216226 CHAPTER 1. HOW IMPORTANT IS INTRAHOUSEHOLD [...] ?
How eective is wives' labor supply as insurance against income uctuations due to husbands'
unemployment? In other words, what is the fraction of lost family income that is made up
by the wife's response to the husband's unemployment spell? To answer this question we
compute, for each level of asset holdings, a, the following fraction,
[hf(0;1;a)   hf(1;1;a)]wf
hm(1;1;a)wm   bm ;
where hf(0;1;a) denotes hours worked by a female with an unemployed husband and hf(1;1;a)
denotes female hours worked if the husband is employed. The denominator represents lost
income due to husband's unemployment. The numerator is the increase in income due to the
wife's response in hours. We then average out across asset holdings. For the group of liquidity-
constrained households (i.e., with asset holdings less than two months worth of income) we
obtain that wives' response makes up about 9% of lost family income, while this number
is only 1% when we consider all households. Households with high levels of asset holdings
use savings to smooth consumption upon husband's unemployment rather than using spouse
labor supply. Liquidity-constrained households must rely, however, on spousal labor supply.
Spousal Labor Supply and the Generosity of Unemployment Benets
Some authors have argued that the nding of a moderate to nil added worker eect may
be partially explained by the presence of public unemployment insurance schemes. That is,
unemployment payments during the husband's unemployment spell crowd out wife's labor
supply. To quantify this eect, Cullen and Gruber (2000) estimate the response in wives'
hours of work during their husbands' spells of unemployment to changes in unemployment
benets. They nd evidence of a crowd out eect, i.e., increasing the benets received by
unemployed husbands reduces their wives' hours of work. Moreover, they also nd a dier-
entially larger response of wives' labor supply among those households that are less able to
smooth consumption through own savings.
We use our model economy to compute the crowding out of unemployment benets on wives'
labor supply. Table 6 below presents the results of this exercise. A 50% reduction in un-
employment benets received by the husband increases wife's hours by almost 5% for the
group of liquidity-constrained households. This increase is only 0:71% when all households
are considered. The relatively higher sensitivity of spousal labor supply to unemployment
benets among liquidity-constrained households found in our model in is line with the nding
of Cullen and Gruber (2000).16
16In order to compare the relative responsiveness of couples with diering levels of assets these authors split
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Table 6. Unemployment Benets and Female Labor Supply During Male's Unemployment Spells
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
10% reduction in bm +0:91% +0:14%
50% reduction in bm +4:97% +0:71%
Notes: This table shows the percentage increase in female labor supply upon a male's unemployment
spell yielded by 10% and 50% reductions in unemployment benets in our baseline economy with
collective households.
Even though a direct comparison of our results with those estimated by Cullen and Gruber
(2000) is not straightforward, it seems that our model underpredicts the crowding out eect of
unemployment benets on spouse labor supply. According to their estimates, a 50% reduction
in potential unemployment benets of the husband (75 USD per week) would imply an increase
in monthly hours worked by the wife (conditional on working) of 13:42 hours, which amounts to
an increase of about 9%. Our model predicts that a 50% reduction in benets receipt increases
spouse labor supply, in the group of liquidity-constrained households, by 5%. It should be
noted however that the estimate in Cullen and Gruber is not statistically signicant, thus
hindering the assessment of our model's predictions.
1.4.3 Consumption Loss Upon Unemployment
The loss of the job implies, under imperfect capital markets, a reduction in the level of in-
dividual consumption. In the case of complete markets, there is no consumption loss upon
an unemployment shock. In the opposite extreme case of bachelor individuals with no assets,
unable to borrow and with no entitlement to unemployment benets, the consumption loss is
one hundred percent. In intermediate cases with partial insurance, the degree of transmission
of unemployment shocks to consumption depends on factors such as the generosity of unem-
ployment benets, on the level of accumulated wealth and on whether risks are shared within
the household.
In this section we use our benchmark economy to assess the contribution of intrahousehold
risk sharing to individual consumption insurance, as measured by the degree of transmission
of unemployment shocks to consumption. We do so by comparing individual consumption
their sample of unemployment spells according to the age of the couple. Then, they interpret that households
where the two spouses are under 40 years of age are liquidity constrained.
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losses upon unemployment in the collective household model to those in the bachelor model.
We compute the percentage change in consumption upon unemployment, 4c=c; for all asset
holdings in the support of the corresponding equilibrium distribution. In the collective econ-
omy, individual consumption losses for females and males, both with an employed spouse and
with an unemployed spouse, are computed as,
 
cj(sj = 1;si;a)   cj(sj = 0;si;a)
cj(sj = 1;si;a)
for j = f;m, i = f;m and i 6= j, both for si = 1 and si = 0. For the bachelor econ-
omy, individual consumption losses upon unemployment are simply computed as,  (cj(1;a) 
cj(0;a))=cj(1;a) for j = f;m.
In Table 7 we report average individual consumption losses, both for the group of liquidity-
constrained individuals and for all individuals. We use the respective equilibrium asset and
employment distributions to average out individual consumption losses. The results show
that intrahousehold risk sharing provides important consumption smoothing opportunities,
especially for liquidity-constrained individuals. Thus, the average consumption loss for a
liquidity-constrained female in the bachelor economy is  19:81%, against only  2:84% in the
collective economy, which is eight times smaller. For a liquidity-constrained male, intrahouse-
hold risk sharing reduces the consumption loss from  29:28% to  6:41%. These numbers
imply that the family is an important provider of consumption insurance for a signicant
fraction of individuals.
Table 7. Individual consumption loss upon unemployment
Collective Model Bachelor Model
Liquidity-constrained Liquidity-constrained
individuals All individuals individuals All individuals
Females, 4cf=cf  2:84%  0:13%  19:81%  0:35%
Males, 4cm=cm  6:41%  0:32%  29:28%  0:57%
Notes: This table presents individual insurance as measured by the percentage of consumption lost
upon an unemployment shock.
We now study household insurance by computing the fraction of income loss (due to an
unemployment shock) that translates into consumption loss. To do this we compute income
and consumption losses upon an unemployment shock for each household across the asset
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and employment distributions. Then, we average out the percentage of income loss that is
transmitted to consumption loss across all households. Table 8 presents our results under the
two household arrangements.
Table 8. Fraction of income loss that transmits to consumption loss
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Collective Household Economy 11:43% 0:66%
Bachelor Household Economy 32:82% 0:74%
Notes: This table presents household insurance as measured by the degree of transmission of the
income loss to consumption upon an unemployment shock.
It should be noted that, even in the collective household economy, the fraction of income
loss that transits to consumption loss in the group of liquidity-constrained households is non-
negligible. For an average household in this group, 11:43% of the household income lost due
to an unemployment shock is absorbed by consumption. This result is consistent with the
empirical nding of Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008) about the degree of insurability of
transitory income shocks. These authors nd that the impact of these shocks on consumption
is small when estimated from all households in their sample, but it is found to be larger in
the subsample of wealth-poor households (these authors dene a household as wealth poor
if its wealth in the rst year this household is observed is in the bottom 20 percent of the
distribution of initial wealth). Their estimate of the degree of partial insurance of temporary
shocks in the sample of low-wealth households is close to 0:2.
Consumption Loss and the Generosity of Unemployment Benets
We now turn to the sensitivity of household consumption losses upon unemployment with
respect to the generosity of unemployment benets, and assess the extent to which our model
economy with collective households matches the empirical ndings of Browning and Crossley
(2001). These authors use a Canadian panel data set to estimate how changes in household
consumption following a job loss vary with the generosity of unemployment benets. Their
empirical exercise exploits legislative changes to the unemployment insurance system intro-
duced in 1993 and 1994, which reduced the replacement rate by about ve percentage points.
In total, 19;000 individuals who had experienced a job separation either before or after the
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policy reform where interviewed several times after the job loss. Browning and Crossley (2001)
obtain two main results. First, the level of unemployment benets has small average eects on
household consumption loss upon unemployment. In particular, a 10 percentage-point reduc-
tion in benets leads to an average fall in consumption of 0:8%.17 Second, the consumption
eects of unemployment benets are not homogeneous across households. For instance, for
the sub-sample of liquidity-constrained households at the time of job separation these eects
are substantially larger. (These authors also follow Zeldes (1989) in dening a household as
liquidity-constrained if its non-housing wealth is less than two months of average disposal
income.) These results show the importance of unemployment benets as a consumption
smoothing instrument for a large number of households. They also highlight the importance
of carrying out analyses which go beyond the representative agent model and thus beyond
estimating mean eects.
Table 9 below presents the elasticities of consumption loss with respect to unemployment ben-
ets in our model economy with and without intrahousehold risk sharing, and compares the
results to the estimates in Browning and Crossley (2001). Our quantitative exercise explicitly
acknowledges the panel dimension of the empirical exercise conducted by these authors. We
compute the relative change in consumption from the period prior to the unemployment shock
to the period in which the job separation is realized. Saving household decisions in the pre-
unemployment period are used for the computation of consumption when the unemployment
shock hits. That is, consumption of an individual of gender j in the period before unem-
ployment is cj(sj = 1;si;a) and consumption at the time of the job loss is cj(sj = 0;si;a0),
where a0 = a0(sj = 1;si;a). We then weigh consumption levels in both periods using the
stationary distribution of employment shocks for the spouse (in the collective economy). Our
collective household economy accounts well for the elasticity of consumption loss with respect
to benets in the group of liquidity-constrained households. It however underestimates this
elasticity for the whole sample of households.
17Gruber (1997) uses U.S. data on food consumption from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
nds a larger mean eect of unemployment benets on consumption losses upon unemployment. This author
estimates that a 10 percentage-point increase in benets reduces the fall in consumption by 2:65%.
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Table 9. Elasticity of Household Consumption Loss to Unemployment Benets
Households with wealth less
than two months worth of income All households
Data (Browning and Crossley 2001)  0:0922  0:05
Collective Household Economy  0:0827  0:0013
Bachelor Household Economy  0:2044  0:0024
Notes: This table presents the sensitivity of household consumption loss upon unemployment with
respect to the generosity of unemployment benets.
It is important to note that estimates by Browning and Crossley (2001) of the elasticity of
household consumption loss upon unemployment with respect to unemployment benets use
Canadian data, while our baseline parameter values have been chosen to match some U.S.
stylized facts. Since it is likely that this elasticity diers when evaluated at U.S. equilibrium
values, our exercise in this section should not be taken as an attempt at matching the estimated
Canadian elasticity. It serves, however, to shed further light on the role of intrahousehold risk
sharing. The elasticity predicted by the bachelor economy, 0:2044, is more than two times
the elasticity under collective households.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we assess quantitatively the eects of intrahousehold risk sharing on savings
and labor supply within a model of idiosyncratic unemployment risk. With this purpose,
we present a model economy where households are formed by a female and a male, who
make collective decisions and lack access to a complete capital market. Our model is a
dynamic version of the standard collective model of the household developed by Chiappori
and co-authors since the 1980's, which assumes ecient risk sharing within the household.
Equipped with this model, we then ask about the quantitative eects of this informal insurance
arrangement on individual and aggregate savings and labor supplies, on the extent of the
precautionary motive and on the crowding out eects of public insurance. In light of our
results, we conclude that intrahousehold risk sharing has large quantitative eects on all
these margins explored. Importantly, we nd that our model economy accounts for key
elasticities of savings and spousal labor supply with respect to unemployment benets, as
estimated by Engen and Gruber (2001) and Cullen and Gruber (2000), respectively. We also
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show that standard models, which abstract from intrahousehold risk sharing, fail to match
those elasticities. A conclusion we draw from the exercise in this paper is that ignoring risk
sharing at the level of the household introduces an important bias not only on the extent of
the precautionary motive but also on the distortionary eects of public insurance programs.
The model we present in this paper can be used to address a number of related questions. In
particular, we plan to use versions of this model to shed further light on a recent debate about
gender-based taxation. A number of scholars have argued in favor of taxing females and males
dierently on the grounds of their dierent elasticities of labor supply. The interplay of income
tax rates with Pareto weights within the household is bound to introduce tradeos that have
been so far overlooked in this debate. A dierent extension that is worth pursuing is the
consideration of permanent income shocks when household members have no-commitment to
future household allocations. Under no commitment, variability in Pareto weights is magnied
relative to the commitment case. It is then to be expected that the quantitative eects of
intrahousehold risk sharing we found in this paper increase under the assumption of no-
commitment. Finally, in light of recent results on the degree of household insurability against
dierent types of shocks and the evolution of consumption and income inequality (see, e.g.,
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston 2008), we need models that can account for the observed
ability of households to insure dierent kinds of risks. Models with two-person households
and perfect risk sharing within the household are a rst step in this direction.
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1.6 Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
(a) The proof of this part follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem and Theorem 3
and Corollary 2 in Denardo (1967).
(b) Case 1: We consider rst values of a such that a0(s;a) > a (interior solution).
(i) cf(s;a), cm(s;a) are strictly increasing in a. Take the envelope condition (using A2):
Va(s;a;) = Uf
c (cf(s;a);)(1 + r) = (1   )Um
c (cm(s;a);)(1 + r): (1.6.1)
Since V (s;a;) is strictly concave, Va(s;a;) is strictly decreasing in a. It follows that
Ui
c(ci(s;a;);), i = f;m; must be strictly decreasing in a as well. Since Ui is strictly
concave in ci, the result follows.
(ii) a0(s;a) increasing in a. By contradiction: suppose there were values a1;a2 such that
a2 > a1 and a0(s;a2) < a0(s;a1). Then since cf(s;a) is strictly increasing in a (as shown
before), it has to be that cf(s;a0(s;a2)) < cf(s;a0(s;a1)). As utility is separable and













However, the Euler equation then implies U
f
c (cf(s;a2);) > U
f
c (cf(s;a1);), which is a
contradiction because cf(s;a2) > cf(s;a1).






 wisi; for i = f;m; (1.6.2)
with inequality if li = 1. Since ci(s;a) is strictly increasing in a, Ui
c(ci(s;a);) is strictly
decreasing in a. Hence, Ui
l(;li(si = 1;sj;a)) has to be decreasing in a, too. This implies
that li(si = 1;sj;a) is increasing in a.
Case 2: Consider now values of a such that a0(s;a) = a (non-interior solution).
In this case the budget constraint reads
cf(s;a) + cm(s;a) = wf(1   lf(s;a))sf + wm(1   lm(s;a))sm + (1 + r)a   a: (1.6.3)
The proof is by contradiction:
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(i) Suppose that lf(s;a) is decreasing in a and lm(s;a) is increasing in a. From intratem-
poral optimality (1.6.2) it follows that cf(s;a) must be decreasing in a and that cm(s;a)
must be increasing in a. This is a contradiction with (1.2.12).
(ii) Suppose that lf(s;a) is increasing in a and lm(s;a) is decreasing in a. From intratem-
poral optimality (1.6.2) it follows that cf(s;a) must be increasing in a and that cm(s;a)
must be decreasing in a. This is a contradiction with (1.2.12).
(iii) Suppose that lf(s;a) and lm(s;a) are decreasing in a. From intratemporal optimality
(1.6.2) it follows that cf(s;a) and cm(s;a) must be decreasing in a. This is a contradic-
tion with (1.6.3).
Hence, lf(s;a) and lm(s;a) are increasing in a, and (1.6.3) implies that cf and cm are strictly
increasing in a.
(c) Case 1: Consider values of a such that a0(s;a) > a (interior solution).
As in the proof of Lemma 1 in Huggett (1993), it can be shown by induction that Va(sj =
1;si;a)  Va(sj = 0;si;a); 8si, using the assumption that i
1j1  i
1j0. The result then follows
immediately from the envelope condition (1.6.1).
Case 2: We consider now values of a such that a0(s;a) = a (non-interior solution).
First we show that cj(sj = 1;si = 0;a)  cj(sj = 0;si = 0;a). Evaluating the budget
constraint at these two household's employment shocks we obtain,
cj(sj = 1;si = 0;a) + ci(sj = 1;si = 0;a) + a   (1 + r)a   wj(1   lj(sj = 1;si = 0;a)) = 0
cj(sj = 0;si = 0;a) + ci(sj = 0;si = 0;a) + a   (1 + r)a = 0: (1.6.4)
This implies that cj(sj = 1;si = 0;a) + ci(sj = 1;si = 0;a)  cj(sj = 0;si = 0;a) + ci(sj =
0;si = 0;a). The result follows from the rst-order condition for consumption, (1.2.12).
We now show that cj(sj = 1;si = 1;a)  cj(sj = 0;si = 1;a). Using the budget constraint
and eliminating terms we get,
cj(sj = si = 1;a) + ci(sj = si = 1;a)   wi(1   li(sj = si = 1;a))   wj(1   lj(sj = si = 1;a))
= cj(sj = 0;si = 1;a) + ci(sj = 0;si = 1;a)   wi(1   li(sj = 0;si = 1;a)): (1.6.5)
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that ci(sj = 1;si = 1;a) < ci(sj = 0;si = 1;a). Intratem-
poral optimality (1.6.2) then requires li(sj = 0;si = 1;a) > li(sj = 1;si = 1;a), and (1.2.12)
implies cj(sj = 1;si = 1;a) < cj(sj = 0;si = 1;a). Hence, the right hand side of equation
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(1.6.5) is strictly larger than the rst three terms on the left hand side, which immediately
leads to a contradiction.
(d) Start from cj(sj = 1;si;a)  cj(sj = 0;si;a);8a. Then (1.2.12) implies that ci(sj =
1;si;a)  ci(sj = 0;si;a). The result follows immediately from equations (1.2.13) and
(1.2.14).
(e) By contradiction: suppose there is an a 2 [a;a] such that a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a) > a and
Ui
c(ci(sf = 0;sm = 0;a);) = (1 + r)E
h
Ui
c(ci(s0;a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a));)
i
; i = f;m:
(The equality follows from a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a) > a  a.) Since (i) (1 + r)  1, (ii) ci(s;a)













Combining these two expressions implies that
Ui






Using part (c) this can only hold if ci(s;a) is the same for all s 2 S  S and, consequently,
a0(s;a) > a for all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this implies that future








The Euler equation, however, requires
Ui






which is impossible for (1 + r)  1.
Strict inequality: suppose there is an a 2 (a;a) such that a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a) = a. Using
part (c) it follows that a0(s;a)  a for all s. Since consumption is strictly increasing in a, this
implies that future consumption will be at least as high as current consumption in any state
s0 and, hence,
Ui
c(ci(sf = 0;sm = 0;a);)  E
h
Ui
c(ci(s0;a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;;a));)
i
:
The Euler equation, however, requires
Ui
c(ci(sf = 0;sm =;a);) = (1 + r)E
h
Ui
c(ci(s0;a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a));)
i
;
(the equality follows from a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;a) = a > a). This is impossible for (1 + r) < 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
In order to compact notation, we will write ~ a() simply as ~ a.
(a) Let us rst assume r > 0. We prove that a0(s;e a)  e a. The result then follows from
the fact that a0(s;a) is increasing in a, as shown before. From part (c) of Proposition 1,
a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)  e a. Then using the budget constraint:
a0(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)  e a (1.6.6)
wf 

1   lf(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)

 0 + wm 

1   lm(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)

 0
+(1 + r)e a   cf(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)   cm(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)  e a (1.6.7)
cf(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a) + cm(sf = 0;sm = 0;e a)  re a: (1.6.8)
From before we know that decision rules for consumption are increasing in endowments; hence,
cf(s;e a) + cm(s;e a)  re a ; 8s:
Finally, use the denition of e a from above and the FOC with respect to leisure to get
lf(s;e a) = lm(s;e a) = 1 ; 8s:
Hence, a0(s;e a)  e a.
Case r  0: Take a1 < a2 and thus cf(s;a1) + cm(s;a1) < cf(s;a2) + cm(s;a2). Plug in the
budget constraints:
wf(1   lf(s;a1))sf + wm(1   lm(s;a1))sm + (1 + r)a1   a0(s;a1) <
wf(1   lf(s;a2))sf + wm(1   lm(s;a2))sm + (1 + r)a2   a0(s;a2) (1.6.9)
and thus
a0(s;a2) a0(s;a1) < (1+r)(a2 a1)+wf(lf(s;a1) lf(s;a2))sf +wm(lm(s;a1) lf(s;a2))sm:















That is, the decision rule for capital accumulation has a slope that is strictly lower than 1 and
strictly positive. This implies that for all s there is a level of asset holdings e a(s) (this is not
the same e a as above!) such that a0(s;e a)  e a, i.e. a0 crosses the 45 degree line at most once.
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(b) Take an arbitrary level of asset holdings a0  e a and check whether the proposed allocation n
b cf;b cm;b lf;b lm;b a0
o
satises rst-order optimality:
 equation (1.2.12) is satised by denition
 b cf + b cm = a r  e a r = e cf + e cm; moreover, b ci  e ci =) b Ui
c  e Ui
c, i = f;m, which implies
by (1.2.20) that equations (1.2.13) and (1.2.14) are satised
 the budget constraint (1.2.10) holds and
 the Euler equation (1.2.16) holds because consumption is constant.
Since the problem is concave, rst-order optimality is sucient for an optimum. Since the
policy functions characterize the optimum, the proposed allocation is optimal.
(c) The proof exploits results in Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), which are also used in
Marcet, Obiols-Homs and Weil (2007). Part (a) implies that at  e a(); 8t, and part (b)
of Proposition 1 together with part (b) of Proposition 2 imply that ci
t  e ci(); i = f;m;
so that individual consumption levels are bounded almost surely. The rst-order condition
to savings (1.2.16) and (1.2.17) imply that Ui
c;t  Et(Ui
c;t+1) almost surely, so that Ui
c;t is a
super-martingale. As Ui





, we can apply the martingale
convergence theorem, which implies that Ui
c;t converges almost surely to a random variable.
Suppose, by contradiction, that Ui






which would imply that consumption levels would converge to values b ci < e ci(), so that
the consumption-leisure choice would be interior for at least one of the two spouses when
employed. In that case labor income would converge to   wf(1   b lf)sf + wm(1   b lm)sm,
where b lf and/or b lm are strictly smaller than 1 and solve (1.2.13) and (1.2.14).  is a non-
degenerate random variable with positive variance, which implies that the lower or upper
bounds on asset holdings would be violated with positive probability, a contradiction. This
follows from the result of Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) that under (1+r) = 1 consumption
and asset grow with no bound if income is suitably stochastic. Thus, Ui
c;t cannot converge to a












consumption will converge to e ci(). The budget constraint implies that at must converge to
e a().
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Appendix II: The Complete Markets Economy
Let (s) denote the number of Arrow securities owned by the collective household. Then the
























wi(1   li)si +
X
i=f;m
(1   si)bi + (s)(1.6.11)
cf;cm  0; 0  lf;lm  1: (1.6.12)
where p(s;s0) denotes the price of an Arrow security that is purchased by a household in state
s and pays one unit of the consumption good in the subsequent period if state s0 is realized.
For a household with relative Pareto weight  in state s, solving (1:6:10) yields the following
system of optimality conditions:
Uf



















c 8s0 2 S  S: (1.6.16)
Imposing the no-arbitrage condition, 1 + r =
s0js
p(s;s0), one can rewrite the Euler equation as,
Uf
c = (1 + r)Uf0
c 8s0 2 S  S: (1.6.17)




c 8s0 2 S  S: (1.6.18)
That is, households choose (s0) such that the marginal utility of consumption is equalized
across dierent states and dierent points in time. In the special case when utility is separable
between consumption and leisure, consumption levels are independent of the individual state
and constant over time.
Denition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with complete markets in the
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measure of households  , a set of prices









and a pricing function pp(s;s0) such that:
















are the associated opti-
mal policy functions.
(2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the rm's rst-order conditions:
(i) r = FK(K;L)   
(ii) wf = (1   )FL(K;L)
(iii) wm = FL(K;L):





























(3) The pricing function p(s;s0) satises a no-arbitrage condition: 1 + r =
s0js
p(s;s0).
(4) The steady-state condition (1 + r) = 1 holds.
(5) The government budget is balanced: q
f
0bf + qm
0 bm = f  wfLf + m  wmLm.
Appendix III: Frisch Elasticities of Labor Supply








1 (1   m)  wm + qm
0 bm; (1.6.19)
is a function of female and male wages, Frisch elasticities of labor supply depend both on
the Pareto weight and its derivative with respect to wages. In this Appendix we derive the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply for females and males. For convenience, we write again the
rst-order conditions with respect to leisure at an interior solution. If we use  to denote the
marginal utility of wealth, these rst-order conditions are
(x;z)U
f
l = wf (1.6.20)
(1   (x;z))Um
l = wm: (1.6.21)
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The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, say i, of an agent of gender i = f;m captures how her/his
labor supply responds to an intertemporal reallocation of wages that leaves the marginal utility










For females, the Frisch elasticity can be readily obtained after dierentiating equation (1:6:20)













dwf = ; (1.6.23)
where 1 denotes the derivative of  with respect to it rst argument, x. After plugging the


























1 wm + qm
0 bmUm
l + (1   )Um
ll
dlm
dwm = : (1.6.25)
After rearranging terms, plugging in the value of  from the rst-order condition and multi-

















Appendix IV: Household Risk Aversion with Risk Sharing
In this appendix we derive the coecient of risk aversion of the two-person collective household
as a function of individual preferences for risk and the relative Pareto weight. We also show
that the derivative of the risk-sharing rule for a household member of gender i = f;m,
is given by the product of the household's coecient of risk aversion and the individual's
coecient of risk tolerance. The coecient of absolute risk aversion of a bachelor household






; for i = f;m:
For the utility function assumed in (3.5), this coecient is i=c.
When two individuals with dierent attitudes towards risk form a household and share risks,
the household's coecient of risk aversion is obviously dierent from individual ones. Collec-
tive household's risk preferences will depend on individual preferences and Pareto weights.
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Collective Household's Risk Aversion
Let us denote the utility function of the two-person, collective household over total household
consumption, y, and individual leisures, lf and lm, by u(y;lf;lm;). This utility function is
dened as,
u(y;lf;lm) = max
cf;cmfUf(cf;lf) + (1   )Um(cm;lm)g (1.6.27)
s:t: = cf + cm = y: (1.6.28)
With this utility function we can write the maximization problem solved by the collective
household as,
~ V (s;a;) = max
lf;lm;a0;~ c




~ V (s0;a0;)g (1.6.29)
s:t: ~ c + a0 =
X
i=f;m
wi(1   li)si +
X
i=f;m
(1   si)bi + (1 + r)a: (1.6.30)
The coecient of absolute risk aversion of a collective household with Pareto weight  can





To derive this coecient of risk aversion let us consider the rst-order condition to the static
maximization problem embedded into the household problem,
'f
c(cf) f
= (1   )'m
c (cm) m
: (1.6.31)
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 =
fm
mcf + fcm; (1.6.36)
and the coecient of relative risk aversion is
fm(cf+cm)
mcf+fcm .
Now, it is straightforward to show that the derivatives of the sharing rules, dcf
dy and dcm
dy ,
are given by the household's coecient of absolute risk aversion, , times the coecient of











where the expression within brackets on the right-hand side is the household's coecient of
absolute risk aversion and the second term, cf=f, is the individual's coecient of absolute
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F  −  husband unemployed
F  −  husband employed
M  −  wife unemployed
M  −  wife employed
Figure 1.1: Policy functions for labor supply in the collective model
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sF = 0, sM = 0
sF = 1, sM = 0
sF = 0, sM = 1
sF = 1, sM = 1





Excess hours worked of household without risk sharing (average)
Asset holdings a
Figure 1.2: Excess hours worked of household without risk sharing
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A Theory of Inequality between
Single and Married Households
Keywords: Inequality; Wealth Distribution; Collective Model; Incomplete Markets.
JEL Classication Numbers: D13; D31; D91; E21.
2.1 Introduction
Marriage is one of the most important determinants of economic prosperity. Yet somewhat
surprisingly, most existing theories of inequality abstract from the role of the family: the
standard framework for studying inequality treats all households as being comprised of a single
decision-maker, without making the role of the marital status explicit. The main purpose of
this paper is to ll this void and present a theory that can account for the observed inequality
between single and married households.
The cross-sectional distributions of earnings, income and wealth in the United States display
a large degree of concentration.1 When disaggregated into married and single households,
economic prosperity remains very unequally distributed within both subgroups, and there is
a striking divergence in per-capita means: on average, married people have 49.4 percent higher
labor earnings, they earn 26.8 percent more income, and they are 33.5 percent richer than
singles. These disparities are not driven by extremely rich households since the corresponding
ratios of medians look very similar. In light of the empirical relevance of the family { in the
1See D az-Gim enez/Glover/R os-Rull (2007), Heathcote/Perri/Violante (2010) and Hinter-
maier/K oniger (2010).
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year 2009, half of the adult population in the United States was married { reconciling the
strong association between marital status and economic outcomes is a challenge that models
of inequality must face.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I show that a standard incomplete-markets
life-cycle model augmented by two dierent household types, single and married, fails to
account for the positive relationship between marriage and wealth. The reason is that the
risk-sharing component of household saving attenuates the precautionary motive for families
with multiple earners and, hence, counterfactually predicts lower per-capita savings. Second,
I present a theory that can, to a large extent, quantitatively account for the distributions of
earnings, income and wealth across single and married households. One of the novel features
I propose relates to the explicit distinction between intentional and accidental bequests: if
intergenerational ties are tighter in families with descendants, they have an additional in-
centive to transmit their estates to the next generation. Furthermore, I capture the bonus
incorporated in the U.S. tax system which eectively favors married couple, and I assess
the role of positive assortative mating in conjunction with a higher propensity to marry for
college-educated people.
The model economy I present in this paper is a version of the neoclassical growth model
with uninsurable, idiosyncratic risk (see Aiyagari (1994)). Following recent studies in the
literature, I mix some desirable features of both life-cycle and dynasty models by assuming
stochastic transitions from working age to retirement and eventually death. Throughout their
working age, individuals receive idiosyncratic labor eciency shocks. They use buer-stock
savings in a riskless asset, subject to a borrowing constraint, to smooth consumption over
time, and they save for retirement. Since there are no aggregate shocks in the economy, the
model yields a stationary distribution over asset holdings and employment shocks that can be
compared to the data. My further modeling choices are motivated by the main focus of this
paper. I assume that there are equally many female and male individuals who are randomly
selected into households of dierent sizes when entering the economy. Some households consist
of one person (\single"), others consist of two persons (\married'). Two-person households,
formed by a female and a male, pool their income and make collective decisions on individual
consumptions, labor supplies and joint savings. Individual weights in the household's utility
function are determined upon matching and remain unchanged thereafter.
This basic framework is extended in three major dimensions. First, I introduce a perma-
nent component into the specication of the idiosyncratic labor eciency process in order to
capture the college premium in wages. Modeling the interplay between assortative match-
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ing and a higher propensity to marry for college-educated people is a necessary ingredient
to partially account for the income and wealth disparity between single and married people.
Second, I acknowledge that the U.S. tax code encourages married couples to le their taxes
jointly. Joint ling will often result in a more favorable tax bracket and, thus, raise permanent
disposable income. Since precautionary saving is typically associated with a target wealth-to-
permanent-income ratio, married couples are led to save more. My ndings indicate, in fact,
that modeling the tax bonus signicantly contributes to generating a positive wealth gap.
Third, I propose a novel way of linking the transmission of wealth across generations, and
I distinguish explicitly between intentional and accidental bequests by relating the bequest
motive to the presence of descendants. Families who are altruistic towards their ospring will
decumulate assets at a slower rate at the end of their lives, which may help to explain why
married people save more.
A calibrated version of my benchmark model does a good job of accounting for the empiri-
cal distributions of earnings, income and wealth across single and married households in the
United States. The model successfully reproduces signicantly greater per-capita earnings and
wealth for married individuals; by contrast, a standard model that lacks the three additional
channels laid out above fails to generate a large disparity for income, and it counterfactually
predicts that singles hold more wealth. The latter result is due to the fact that intrahousehold
risk sharing strongly attenuates the precautionary saving motive. Then, in a series of counter-
factual experiments, I deactivate the three additional channels one by one in order to quantify
their relative importance for my results. My ndings indicate that properly accounting for the
assortative matching component of marriage formation, the tax bonus for married households
and the distinction between accidental and intentional bequests all contribute signicantly to
explaining the per-capita gap in wealth. Finally, in order to assess the actual implications
of joint tax ling, I use my model economy to conduct a hypothetical policy reform that
abolishes this possibility. My results suggest that moving to separate tax ling would lead to
large aggregate welfare gains, but, at the same time, widen the per-capita wealth gap even
further, because married couples would be forced to save more for precautionary reasons.
This paper mostly relates to two strands of literature. First, it builds upon earlier work
that studies cross-sectional income and wealth inequality in general equilibrium frameworks
with heterogeneous agents, e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998),
Casta~ neda et al. (2003) and De Nardi (2004). In particular the last two examples share large
commonalities with the model presented in this paper since they also study environments
with life-cycle and dynastic elements. All of these studies, however, abstract from modeling
the marital status of a household. A second body of literature makes this distinction more
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3216254 CHAPTER 2. A THEORY OF INEQUALITY BETWEEN [...]
explicit by considering single and married households separately; examples include Aiyagari
et al. (2000), Greenwood et al. (2003), Cubeddu and R os-Rull (2003) and Hong and R os-Rull
(2003).
To the best of my best knowledge, there is no theoretical work on per-capita dierences
between single and married households and cross-sectional income and wealth inequality in a
joint context. The study most closely related to this one is a working paper by Guner and
Knowles (2004) who also investigate the link between marriage and wealth in a dynamic OLG
setting. In their model, single agents and married couples make decisions on consumption,
hours worked and savings, and they decide whom to marry and when to divorce, in anticipation
of future outcomes. The authors show that their model can generate a signicant positive
wealth gap. The main dierence to my framework is that Guner and Knowles (2004) model
consumption within married households as a public good and calibrate it using estimates
for adult equivalence scales, which may be a driving force for their results. Furthermore,
since their model only consists of three periods, it neglects the strong family insurance eect
for precautionary saving and probably performs poorly when tested along the cross-sectional
dimension.
The divergence in eective taxation between single and married households and the role
of joint tax ling has been the subject of a recent study by Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura
(2008). These authors construct a life-cycle economy populated by single and married workers
who dier according to their labor eciency and age. At the heart of their analysis lies an
exogenous utility cost of participating in the labor market. This assumption allows them to
focus on the extensive margin of married female labor supply. The authors use their model to
evaluate various tax reforms, inter alia the abolition of joint tax ling. Their results associate
substantial welfare gains with such a reform and, thus, share a commonality with my own
ndings. In contrast to the ndings presented in this paper, however, their model predicts
output gains. This divergence could potentially be explained by a dierent assumption on how
to redistribute additional tax revenues: they choose to adjust proportional tax rate, whereas
I use lump-sum transfers.
The role of a bequest motive to generate a lifetime saving prole consistent with the data
has been recently put under examination. De Nardi (2004) shows that intentional bequests
can explain the emergence of very large estates and, therefore, help to generate a high degree
of concentration at the upper tail of the wealth distribution. Fuster et al. (2008) study the
signicance of intergenerational links for the impact of various tax reform proposals. They
confront two polar frameworks: a pure life-cycle model, on the one hand, and a dynastic
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/321622.2. THE DATA 55
model with altruistic links, on the other hand. They nd that tax reforms can have very dif-
ferent implications depending on whether individuals derive utility from bequeathing to their
descendants or not. Laitner (2001) introduces the existence of intentional and unintentional
bequests in a common framework. In his model, a constant fraction  of households care
about their descendants, the remaining population only cares about their own lives. In com-
parison to his approach, a novel element in my model is to relate the existence of a bequest
motive explicitly to the presence of a descendant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a documentation of
the most relevant empirical facts motivating this study. In section 3, I present my benchmark
model economy and dene a stationary equilibrium. The calibration strategy is described in
Section 4, and Section 5 contains my results. Concluding remarks are oered in Section 6.
2.2 The Data
To motivate this study, this section documents a number of stylized facts for the distributions
of earnings, income and wealth in the United States. Most of the subsequent data analysis is
based on the 2007 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).2 One advantage of the
SCF is that it provides information on all three variables of interest for this study, whereas
e.g. the Current Population Survey (CPS) does not collect any data on household wealth.
A second advantage is that the Survey of Consumer Finances explicitly oversamples wealthy
households and employs appropriate weighting schemes to adjust for higher non-response rates
among rich households. Therefore, the SCF provides a more accurate description of the upper
tails of the various distributions, as distinguished from other U.S. household surveys such as
the CPS or the PSID.
For the purpose of this study, I restrict the sample to comprise only households where the head
is at least 25 years old. I make an additional adjustment by excluding the wealth-richest 1 %
households for the following reason. In a previous study, Casta~ neda, D az-Gim enez and R os-
Rull (2003) nd that matching the concentration at the very top of the wealth distribution
requires a small-probability state of extremely high hourly wages. For instance, in their
benchmark economy agents in the highest eciency state are more than 100 times more
productive than those in the second-highest state, and they are more than 1,000 times more
productive than agents in the lowest state. In the model presented in the next section agents
draw their labor eciency based on a stochastic earnings process that has been estimated
2A detailed description of the data and variable denitions are provided in Appendix I.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean ($) Median ($) Gini Bottom 40%
All Households
Labor earnings 57,076 37,364 0.59 4.72
Total income 73,868 48,745 0.50 11.71
Wealth 398,872 136,750 0.72 1.81
Married Households
Labor earnings 78,819 56,560 0.53 8.79
Total income 99,768 68,489 0.48 13.51
Wealth 551,571 191,800 0.72 2.82
Single Households
Labor earnings 26,416 15,426 0.63 0.54
Total income 39,348 29,617 0.44 14.14
Wealth 206,555 63,846 0.71 0.66
Source: 2007 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
from PSID data. Since the very rich households are neither present in the PSID nor in my
model, I choose to abstract from them.3
The upper panel in Table 1 summarizes a selection of distributional statistics for labor earn-
ings, total income and wealth across households in the U.S. economy. As is well known, all
three variables are very unequally distributed, with wealth being by far the most concen-
trated one among them. For instance, households belonging to the bottom 40 percent of the
respective distribution earn 11.7 percent of income and they hold only 1.8 percent of total
wealth. The Gini coecient { a more sensitive concentration measure for the upper tail of the
distribution { exceeds 0.5 for all variables of interest and is particularly high for wealth (0.72).
These facts indicate that the cross-sectional distributions of earnings, income and wealth are
highly skewed to the right, with fat lower tails and a very thin upper tail.
The middle and lower panels in Table 1 display the same set of statistics when the sample
is partitioned into married and single households. As can be seen, earnings, income and
wealth remain very unequally distributed across the two subsamples. A notable dierence is
the slightly fatter lower tail for the wealth distribution of single households - the poorest 40
percent hold almost no assets. More strikingly, married households earn signicantly more
income and hold substantially more assets than single households, even when dividing by the
3Recent studies by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010) and Hintermaier and K oniger (2011) pursue
a similar strategy.
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number of household members (cf. Table 1, rst two columns). To make this point more
explicit, I dene
(x)  100  (0:5 xM=xS); (2.2.1)
where I compute the ratio between married and single households, xM=xS, and then divide
it by 2 to obtain a measure for the discrepancy in per-capita values for variable x.
Table 2 reports the resulting values for this measure. As can be seen in the table, married
individuals earn on average 49.4 percent more labor income, their total income is 26.1 percent
higher, and they hold 33.5 percent more wealth than single households. A possible objection
is to argue that many people get married later than at the age of 25, which would imply
that they enter the sample of married households at a later point of their increasing life-cycle
prole of earnings and wealth. To check for this possibility, I restrict the sample to households
where the head is at least 30 years old, an age by which most of the rst marriages have been
formed.4 If the previous point is valid, one would expect that per-capita dierences diminish,
but instead they rise even further. This suggests that the gap at young age is comparatively
small and then opens up over the life cycle.
To further investigate this point, I divide the sample into working-age and retirement-age
subgroups (cf. Table 2). Labor earnings for working-age married individuals are on average
25.6 percent higher than for working-age singles. The corresponding statistic for retired
individuals is with +140 percent much higher, but this result is mainly driven by the fact
that there are more married people who work at old age. As for per-capita income and per-
capita wealth, the picture is similar: married individuals earn on average 17.5 percent more
income and they hold 38.4 percent more assets. During retirement age the discrepancy jumps
up to +43.7 percent (total income) and +50.8 percent (wealth) respectively.
It must be noted that the sample of single households comprises widowed individuals, and
that the share of widows is substantially larger for the retirement subsample. In order to
evaluate the impact of this fact, the last line of Table 2 reports the per-capita wealth gap for
people at retirement age if widowed singles are excluded. The discrepancy rises even further
to +69.2 percent. This suggests that widowed retired individuals are substantially better o
than other singles, which is consistent with the previous ndings under the assumption that
the death of one spouse does not intrinsically elevate the survivor's economic well-being to a
large extent.5
4The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the median age at rst marriage for women and men in the year
2009 was 26.5 and 28.4 respectively.
5In the model presented in the next section I will abstract from widows by assuming that married couples
decease jointly.
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Table 2. Per-capita dierences between married and single households
Popul share (%) Mean Median
Labor earnings
All households 100.0 + 49.4 + 83.3
Age 30+ 92.1 + 55.3 + 97.8
Working age (25 { 59) 69.9 + 25.6 + 13.8
Retirement age (60+ ) 30.1 + 140.0 {
All households (CPS) 100.0 + 27.6 + 52.5
Total income
All households 100.0 + 26.8 + 15.6
Age 30+ 92.1 + 30.1 + 20.4
Working age (25 { 59) 69.9 + 17.5 + 10.8
Retirement age (60+ ) 30.1 + 43.7 + 9.5
All households (CPS) 100.0 + 12.8 + 24.5
Wealth
All households 100.0 + 33.5 + 50.2
Age 30+ 92.1 + 34.3 + 45.6
Working age (25 { 59) 69.9 + 38.4 + 116.8
Retirement age (60+ ) 30.1 + 50.8 + 7.6
Retirement - no widows 21.4 + 69.2 + 30.3
Sources: 2007 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and March 2010 wave of the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
Are these results driven by extreme observation, e.g. by very rich households? To answer this
question, Table 2 also documents per-capita dierences in median values (cf. last column).
The disparity of per-capita wealth between the median married household and the median
single household is with +50.2 percent even more pronounced than the corresponding value for
per-capita means (+33.5 percent), whereas the opposite is true for total income (+15.6 percent
compared to +26.8 percent). The per-capita gap in median labor earnings for households of
all age groups rises to +83.3 percent. A more meaningful comparison between working-age
married and single households yields a gap of +13.8 percent. As a nal robustness exercise, I
investigate whether my previous ndings are in some way specic to the relatively small SCF
sample by performing a similar analysis for the Current Population Survey (CPS) with its
much larger sample size. As can be seen in Table 2, per-capita gaps for average earnings (+27.6
percent) and income (+12.8 percent) remain notably high. They are slightly smaller than in
the SCF, which is perhaps not surprising as income-rich households are underrepresented in
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the CPS.6
To summarize, the preceding analysis has uncovered a set of empirical facts pertaining to
cross-sectional inequality between single and married households in the United States. The
next section turns to presenting a theoretical model that aims at accounting for these facts.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Preliminaries
Demographics. Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of measure one of
households. In each period t = 0;1;2;:::, a cohort of new individuals enters the economy.
Half of them are born are females, the other half are born as males. The life cycle of an
individual consists of three phases: household formation, working age and retirement. The
rst phase takes place before an agent enters the economy (\time 0") and determines whether
individuals will commence their working life as singles or couples. Once households are formed,
they are either comprised of one single adult or two married adults, one female and one male.
Households can be either in the working-age or the retirement stage. At the end of each period,
working-age households face a constant exogenous probability of becoming retired, and retired
households face a constant exogenous probability of dying. When a retired household dies,
its members are replaced by an equal number of newborn agents. The deceased household's
nancial wealth is liquidated and transmitted to the next generation.7 Inheritance takes
place before individuals start working, but after households have been formed. In addition,
married couples face an exogenous probability of separation throughout the working-age and
retirement stages (\divorce"). Divorced agents form single households for the rest of their
lives.
Preferences. All agents enjoy the consumption of an aggregate good and of leisure time.
Preferences for agents of gender g 2 ff;mg can be described by a per-period utility function
Ug(ct;lt), where ct and lt denote consumption and leisure in period t respectively, and a com-
mon discount factor  2 (0;1). I will assume that Ug is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in each of its arguments, twice continuously dierentiable and satises the Inada conditions.
In addition, agents derive utility from bequeathing their estate to their descendants.
Employment opportunities. In each period, agents are endowed with one unit of dispos-
able time and an individual level of labor productivity e that depends on their history of
6There is no comparative value for wealth since the CPS does not collect any data on household net worth.
7The transmission of wealth is detailed below.
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idiosyncratic shocks. Retired agents are not productive at all, i.e. e = 0. In the working-age








where i is a permanent component that is determined when an agent is born and may be
interpreted as an ability shock. I assume that i is drawn from a nite set  that contains
zero as an element. The time-varying part of labor productivity, zi









where  measures the longevity of temporary productivity shocks. To model transitions to
retirement, at the end of each period, there is a probability R that labor productivity is set
to zero permanently, i.e. ei
e t = 0; 8e t = t + 1; t + 2;:::. Agent i's labor productivity in period
t can then be summarized as si
t  (i;ei
t), where si
t 2 S    R implicitly describes whether
an agent is in working age, e > 0, or retired, e = 0.
Household formation. Before a new cohort of agents enters the working-age stage, it is
determined whether they will start their economic lives in a one-person (\single") or two-
person (\married") household. I assume that there is a marriage market that randomly
matches two individuals i and j of opposite gender according to an exogenous probability
q
g
i;j that potentially depends on their relative abilities. The latter assumption allows me
to model the positive assortative matching component of couple formation, which implies
the signicant correlation between permanent wages that is observed in the data.8 Once
two individuals are matched, they enter into a cooperative bargaining process that prescribes
eciency for the resulting allocation (\collective assumption"). If they reach an agreement,
they can fully commit to this outcome and form a two-person household until their marriage is
dissolved exogenously or they die together. Individuals who are left unmatched remain singles
and form one-person households. After individuals have been selected into households, it is
furthermore determined whether the household has descendants (d = 1) or not (d = 0). The
presence of descendants has an impact on the bequest motive and occurs according to an
exogenous probability that depends on the marital status.
Intergenerational transmission. Successive generations of individuals are linked through
the transmission of assets in the following stylized way. I assume that every deceased married
couple leaves their estate to two new entrants in equal shares, i.e. each of the two entrants
8See Hyslop (2001).
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inherits half of the assets. Moreover, I assume that for every deceased single agent there is
another single agent of opposite gender who deceases at the end of the same period; upon death
their estates are pooled and left to two new entrants in equal shares. From the perspective of
newborn individuals, initial asset holdings are determined when they enter the working age,
i.e. after the household formation stage. Each new entrant inherits either half of the estate
of a randomly selected deceased married couple, or half of the sum of assets of two randomly
selected deceased single individuals of opposite gender.9
Firms. Production of the aggregate good is conducted by a continuum of competitive rms.
The representative rm operates a technology that can be represented by the Cobb-Douglas
production function F(K;L) = KL1 , where K is the aggregate stock of capital, L is
aggregate labor and 0 <  < 1 is the capital's share of income. Female and male labor are
assumed to be perfect substitutes, L  Lm + (1   )Lf, where  is a parameter that pins
down relative productivities and can thus be used to model the gender gap in wages. The
rm's maximization problem is static: given a rental price of capital r and gross wages for
females and males wf and wm, respectively, rst-order conditions are:
FK(K;L) = r +  (2.3.3)
FL(K;L) = wm (2.3.4)
(1   )FL(K;L) = wf; (2.3.5)
where  > 0 denotes the depreciation rate of capital.
Government. The government levies taxes on households' income, pays out xed benets
to retired individuals and consumes a public good G. Income taxation for single and married
households can be characterized by two functions, S(y) and M(y), where total household
income y is composed of labor income, capital income and retirement benets. Benets are
allowed to depend on the gender and ability mix of all household members. The government
cannot issue any debt and is thus required to balance its budget on a period-by-period basis.
Market structure. A crucial assumption for the model at hand is that there are no markets
for state-contingent contracts in the economy; hence, workers cannot insure perfectly against
idiosyncratic labor market uncertainty. Also, there is no annuity market to insure individual
9Two clarifying remarks are in order. First, an underlying assumption is that there is a \veil of ignorance"
between deceased agents and newborns, in the sense that neither side knows the other's identity until the
transmission of assets takes place. Second, a constant population size requires that each deceased individual
has on average one descendant. For simplicity, I assume that pairs of agents with d = 1 bequeath only to two
descendant, and that their other descendants inherit from pairs of agents with d = 0. Equivalently, one could
assume that each individual has descendants and those with d = 1 have a bequest motive.
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mortality risk. The only asset in the economy is physical capital, which pays out the risk-
free interest rate r. Moreover, I assume that individuals in this economy are not allowed to
borrow, which imposes a zero lower bound on their asset holdings. The latter assumption
also implies that agents cannot die in debt.
2.3.2 The Problem of the Household
Single household. For a single agent of gender g the relevant state variables are current
wealth a, a vector describing the agent's labor eciency s = (;e), and whether there are de-





Ug(c;l) + [1   (s)]  E [ Vg(a0;s0;d) j s ] + (s)  Zg(a0;d)
)
(2.3.6)
s.t. c + a0 = y   S(y) + a
y = bg(s) + (1   l) e wg + ra





, and A is an upper bound for asset holdings that is suciently large such
that it never binds. Recall that when a household retires, its labor eciency is permanently
set to zero, e = 0. The function (s) describes the probability of dying at the end of the
period and takes on a positive value only when a household is already retired. That is,




D , if e = 0;
0 , if e > 0:
Similarly, retirement benets bg(s) are only paid out to retired households. The value of
bequeathing remaining estates to descendants, Zg(a0;d), depends positively on a0 and will be
described in more detail later.11
Married household. Consider now the maximization problem faced by a married household.
As explained above, it is assumed that at the time of household formation both members can
fully commit to all future allocations. Following the literature of collective households (see
Chiappori and Donni (2010) for a recent survey), the utility of each individual in the household
10For notational convenience, I will suppress the dependence on interest rates and wages. Since this paper
focuses on stationary equilibria only, prices will be constant over time.
11It would be straightforward to extend the model in order to allow for an intergenerational transmission
of earnings ability (see De Nardi (2004)). Since the model is already fairly complex, I abstract from this
possibility.
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carries a weight, reecting the relative power of that individual in the household. Under
full commitment, that is, when household members can commit to future intrahousehold
allocations, individual weights are set when the household is formed and remain unchanged
thereafter. I write the Pareto weight on female's utility as (z) 2 [0;1], where z is a measure
of the relative earnings ability of both spouses that is determined at the household formation
stage, and  is a dierentiable function. The mapping from z to  will be described in more
detail below. Denote by s = (sf;sm) the pair of states describing the labor productivity of
both members in a married household, where s 2 S  SS. A married household with xed
Pareto weights  and (1   ) solves
V (a;s;d;z) = max
cf;cm;lf;lm;a0
(





+ [1   (s)]  E
h










s.t. cf + cm + a0 = y   M(y) + a
y = b(s) +
X
g(1   lg) eg wg + ra
S (a;s;d;z) = (z) Vf(a=2;sf;d) + [1   (z)] Vm(a=2;sm;d)
cf; cm  0; 0  lf; lm  1; a0 2 A; and (2.3.1), (2.3.2):
Married households that do not die at the end of the period face a constant probability   of
divorcing. In case a divorce occurs, the joint continuation value S can be constructed as the
weighted sum of individual continuation values Vf and Vm, and all assets are split equally
between the two household members.
Household formation. Upon entering the marriage market, agents are characterized by
their gender g and their idiosyncratic permanent productivity shock i. It is assumed that an
agent of gender g with ability i is matched stochastically to an agent of opposite gender and
ability j according to an exogenous probability function q
g
i;j. When two agents are matched,
they enter into a collective bargaining process that leads to an ecient allocation decision for
all future contingencies. Under full commitment individual Pareto weights are determined
during household formation and remain unchanged thereafter. I make the assumption that
Pareto weights depend on a measure of the relative earnings ability of the two spouses, which
I dene as z  exp(f)wf=exp(m)wm. It must be noted that in my model the Pareto
weight function (z) is not obtained as the outcome of an explicit bargaining process between
females and males. Instead, I will use estimates of the sharing rule provided by Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994) to parameterize and solve the model. After
married households have been formed, they are assigned descendants with probability M.
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3216264 CHAPTER 2. A THEORY OF INEQUALITY BETWEEN [...]
Individuals who are left unmatched in the marriage market enter the economy as single-person
households, and they are assigned descendants with probability S.
Bequest motive. A retired individual who does not survive into the following period poten-
tially derives utility from leaving his estate (\bequest motive"). A key feature of my model
is that the taste to bequeath wealth depends not only on the size of estates left, but also on
the presence of descendants. More specically, I make the following two assumptions: (a)
Individuals only have a bequest motive if they have descendants, i.e. Zf(a0;0) = Zm(a0;0) =
Z (a0;0) = 0; (b) Individuals with descendants are fully altruistic towards them, i.e. their be-
quest function is equal to the expected value function of the inheritor.12 Since the information
set for all agents is restricted to the mere presence of descendants rather than their identity {
i.e. whether they are female/male, married/single, college-educated or not etc. { the bequest
utility corresponds to the expected utility function for a generic newborn agent, which can be
constructed as the weighted average of expected value functions for agents of both genders,
education levels and marital statuses. As stated above, I assume that married couples with
descendants leave their estate to two entrants in equal shares. Single agents pool their estates
with a randomly selected single agent of opposite gender (second \parent") and leave the
pooled estate in equal shares to two entrants. Since single agents do not know the quantity
of assets contributed by the other parent before dying, they form rational expectations based
on the actual distribution of assets.13
2.3.3 Stationary Equilibrium
To keep notation as compact as possible, I will dene the state space for all types of households
as X  S AD, where I arbitrarily impose S = S f0gf0g if the household is single.14
The Borel algebra generated by an appropriate family of subsets of X is denoted by B. Let
(B;) be a probability measure describing the mass of households with xed Pareto weight
 in B 2 X, where (B;) is dened on B, and I impose  = 0 for single male households
and  = 1 for single female households. The distribution of Pareto weights in the population
of households will be represented by H() and its support by M  [0;1]. Moreover, denote
by P(s;a;B;) the probability that a household with Pareto weight  at state (s;a;d) will
transit to a state that lies in B  B in the next period. The transition function P can be
12The assumption of full altruism has found some support in recent studies, e.g. Casta~ neda et al. (2003) and
Fuster et al. (2008).
13See Appendix III for a formal derivation of the bequest function for single and married households.
14As a consequence, the state s characterizes (i) the labor eciency of all household members, (ii) whether
the household is in working age or retirement; and (iii) whether the household is single or married.
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where I is an indicator function taking on a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise,

(s;s0 2 Bs) is the probability that the exogenous state next period belongs to Bs  S, and
Bs and Ba are the projections of B on S and A respectively.
Denition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in this
economy is a list of functions

Vf;Vm;V;cf;cm;lf;lm;a0;K;Lf;Lm	
, a measure of households
, a set of prices

r;wf;wm	
and a government policy f;b;Gg such that:
1) For given prices, taxes and benets, Vf, Vm and V solve (2.3.6) { (2.3.7), and cf(a;s;d;),
cm(a;s;d;), lf(a;s;d;);lm(a;s;d;) and a0(a;s;d;) are the associated policy func-
tions.
2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the rm's rst-order conditions (1.2.2) { (1.2.4).


















em [1   lm(a;s;d;)] d dH: (2.3.10)





P(a;s;d;B;) d for all B 2 B: (2.3.11)








d dH = G: (2.3.12)
2.4 Parameterization and Calibration
2.4.1 Parameterization











1   g for g = f;m; (2.4.1)
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l are parameters ('
f
c is normalized to one) and g is the coecient of relative
risk aversion of an individual of gender g. It must be noted that in the model with collective
households |and contrary to the model with bachelor households| the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply of an individual of gender g depends not only on parameter g, but is also a
function of variables and parameters that aect the expected, intrahousehold earnings dier-
ential through the Pareto weight.15 A household's risk aversion is determined by individual
preferences for risk and by the household sharing rule . It is only when the two household
members share the same preferences for risk, i.e., f = m, that the household's coecient
of relative risk aversion becomes independent of Pareto weights.16
Technology. As written above, production takes place according to the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology, F(K;L) = KL1 , where labor is L  Lm + (1   )Lf. Parameter 
is the capital share of income and  pins down relative gross wages, since wf=wm = (1 )=.
Labor eciency. The stochastic process for labor productivity is modeled as a mapping
from observed distributions of hourly wages net of xed heterogeneity. Denote by !i
t the log
hourly wage of individual i at time t and specify its evolution as
!i
t = i
0 + 1 xi
t + e zi
t + i





0 represents an unobserved xed eect, xi
t is a vector of observable characteristics
such as age, gender and education, i
t reects measurement error and e zi
t is the time-varying
component of an individual's log wage which corresponds to zi
t in the model and evolves as
posited in equation (2.3.2). Following Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010), I assume
that women and men face the same stochastic process for e z. This assumption mitigates the
selection bias that may be caused by the unobservability of wages for non-working individuals:
the reason is that the wage process specied above can be estimated using only data for men,
for whom selection is a minor concern. In addition, I allow for a correlation structure of
temporary shocks within married households. As for the permanent component of labor
productivity, I impose that  can take on one of two values in  = f0;cg, where c captures
the skill wage premium of college-educated individuals. The fractions of females and males




Taxation. Following Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2008), I construct income tax functions
for single and married households based on estimates for eective taxes paid as a function
of reported income. Using IRS data, Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2008) estimate mean
income and the average tax rate corresponding to each tabulated income bracket, and then t
15See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for a derivation of Frisch elasticities in the collective household economy.
16See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for a derivation of the household's coecient of risk aversion.
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a non-linear equation to the data for single and married households separately. The respective
income tax functions are parameterized as follows:
S(y) = [ S
0 + S
1 log(y) ] y (2.4.3)
M(y) = [ M
0 + M
1 log(y) ] y: (2.4.4)
Pareto weights. I will make the following simplifying assumptions on the distribution of
Pareto weights over the population of married households, G. In my benchmark economy, I
impose that in all households where both members have the same permanent ability (i.e. ei-
ther both are college-educated or both are not college-educated) relative Pareto weights are
equal to 0.5. If abilities dier across household members, relative Pareto weights will in gen-
eral be dierent from 0.5. Specically, I assume that they are set such that the resulting
allocation is consistent with empirical estimates for the sharing rule as presented in Browning
et al. (1994).17
2.4.2 Calibration


















c;c, and two probabilities of having a descendant, S and M. Finally, I











c, b0;0, bc;0, b0;c, bc;c, G, and the derivative of the Pareto weight function with
respect to x (to be detailed later), 1. Altogether, there are 40 parameters to be calibrated.
Demographics. My strategy is to set demographic parameters and matching probabilities
such that the resulting composition of the population in the model mimics the actual pop-
ulation in the United States. Life-cycle parameters are determined as follows: individuals
enter the working-age stage when they are 25, and they retire and die stochastically. I target
the expected durations of their working lives and retirement to be 35 years and 20 years
respectively. The shares of newborn females and males with college education are set to their
empirical counterparts of 40.3 percent and 38.7 percent respectively. Furthermore, I target
the empirical population shares of married couples with all four combinations of education
mixes and the share of marriages leading to a divorce. From CPS data for the year 2009, I
estimate that 50 percent of all households are married. Across all married households, there
are 30.6 percent where both spouses are college-educated, 43.4 percent where neither spouse
17See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for a detailed description of this procedure.
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Table 3. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Discount factor  0:962 Gender premium  0:562
Female risk aversion f 1:75 College premium coll 0:560
Male risk aversion m 1:5 Wage persistence  0:914
Utility weight (f) 'f
c 1 Wage volatility  0:206
Utility weight (m) 'm
c 1:95 Cross-spouse correlation % 0:15
Utility weight (f) '
f
l 3:8 Fraction with college (f) qf
c 0:403
Utility weight (m) 'm
l 1:25 Fraction with college (m) qm
c 0:387
Regulates Frisch elasticity f 1:8 Matching probability q
f
0;0 0:591
Regulates Frisch elasticity m 4:5 Matching probability q
f
0;c 0:185
Probability of retiring R 1=35 Matching probability q
f
c;0 0:274
Probability of dying D 1=20 Matching probability q
f
c;c 0:613
Probability of divorce   0:0092 Probability descendant S 0:34
Capital share  0:36 Probability descendant M 0:89
Capital depreciation rate  0:1 Derivative Pareto weight 1 0:038
has college education, 11.9 percent where only the husband has been college-educated and
13.7 percent where only the wife has college education. As for the divorce rate, I target a
40-percent probability that married couples divorce before dying.18 Given the demographic
structure of the model, these targets uniquely pin down the four matching probabilities and
the divorce probability, which implies that they can be calibrated externally (see Appendix
II for a formal derivation). Finally, the probabilities of having descendants are set to match
the population shares of single (69%) and married (89%) households with children.
Technology. Using estimates for the annual capital depreciation rate and the capital share
of income, I set  = 0:1 and  = 0:36, which are both standard values in the macro literature.
The two parameters  and coll characterize the gender wage gap and the college premium
respectively. Using CPS data, I estimate a ratio between average female and male hourly
wages of 0.78, and a ratio between average wages of college-educated individuals and non-
college educated individuals of 1.75. The values of  and coll are set to match these targets.
The two parameter values characterizing the labor productivity process are set as in Flod en
and Lind e (2001) who use the same specication and estimate  = 0:914 and  = 0:206
from PSID data. Following Heathcote et al. (2010), I target a cross-spouse correlation for
18Divorce rates in the U.S. are typically estimated to be 40-50 percent with higher rates for teenage marriages,
in particular in the rst 5-10 years. Since agents enter my model at the age of 25, I choose a rate of 40 percent.
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Table 4. Fiscal Policy Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Tax function S
0 0:2028 Retirement benets bm
0 0:1062
Tax function S
1 0:0497 Retirement benets bm
c 0:1098
Tax function M
0 0:1732 Retirement benets b0;0 0:1548
Tax function M
1 0:0733 Retirement benets bc;0 0:1667
Public consumption G 0:1125 Retirement benets b0;c 0:1590
Retirement benets b
f




temporary shocks of 0.15.19
Preferences. I normalize '
f
c to 1, which is equivalent to dividing both instantaneous utility
functions by this parameter. Non-gender-based estimates of the average coecient of relative
risk aversion between 1 and 3 are common. When gender is taken into account, females are
found to be more risk-averse than males. I set individual preferences for risk to f = 1:75 and
m = 1:5. Estimates for males' Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the presence of potentially
binding borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Domeij and Flod en 2006). Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) nd that for females this elasticity is 3-4 times larger than for males.
I target values of 0.45 and 1.25 for males and females, respectively. Utility weights are xed
to align with estimates for the amount of time people spend on market work. Specically, I
target median hours worked by single females (34.3 %), married females (30.4 %) and married
males (38.0 %) as fractions of their discretionary time.20 The subjective discount factor  is
set to match a capital-output ratio of 3.
Government. Parameter values for single and married households' income tax functions
are assigned on the basis of empirical estimates as reported in Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura
(2008). The coecients they estimate are obtained by normalizing average income in each
income bracket by mean household income. Hence, I have to adjust them appropriately by
taking into account mean household income in my benchmark economy. Retirement benets
are calibrated on the basis of Social Security income data from the 2010 Current Population
Survey. Specically, I select all single and married households between 65 and 75 years and
compute average benets for each subgroup relative to b
f
0, the average Social Security income
of a single female without college education. The value of b
f
0 is then set to match a value
19See Hyslop (2001).
20These estimates are based on the 2010 wave of the Consumer Population Survey. I make the assumption
that the disposable daily time endowment is 15 hours.
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of 20.9 % for the ratio between retirement benets for that subgroup and mean household
income in 2009. Finally, public consumption G is simply set to balance the budget of the
government.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Benchmark model
As a rst step, I will investigate whether my calibrated benchmark model can account for
the cross-sectional distributions of earnings, income and wealth in the U.S. economy. To this
end, I compute a selected variety of distributional statistics in my benchmark economy and
compare them to their empirical counterparts. As a second step, I will ask whether my model
does a signicantly better job of accounting for the data than a more parsimonious model,
which lacks some of the features I have introduced in the previous section.
Table 5 displays a summary of my results. For each of the three variables of main interest {
labor earnings, income and net worth {, I contrast ve distributional statistics of my bench-
mark economy with their corresponding empirical values. The rst three statistics pertain to
the shape of the respective distribution as measures of cross-sectional inequality, whereas the
nal two statistics directly address the discrepancy in per-capita values between married and
single individuals. Table 5 suggests that the benchmark model does a good job of accounting
for the salient features of the data. It succeeds to generate a degree of dispersion that is in
accordance with the U.S. distributions of earnings, income and wealth, perhaps with the ex-
ception of the respective upper tails where it slightly understates the degree of concentration.
Moreover, the model is capable of replicating the empirical fact that married individuals, on
average, earn more income and hold more assets than singles.
A closer look at the rst four rows reveals that the simulated economy does an excellent job
of accounting for the distribution of labor earnings. At the upper tail, the 5 % households
with the highest income from labor earnings earn 22 percent of total labor income, which
is fairly close to the empirical value of 27.6 percent. The 40 % households with the lowest
income from labor earnings earn only 0.3 percent of total labor income. The discrepancy to
the empirical value of 4.7 percent can potentially be explained by the fact that in my economy
households are by assumption not allowed to work anymore once they are retired (36.4 percent
of the population). As for total income, the model does a very good job of accounting for the
bottom tail. The fact that it slightly underpredicts the degree of dispersion at the upper tail
is related to the shape of the wealth distribution. The reason is that there are not suciently
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Table 5. Summary of results
Bottom 40% Top 5% Gini Mean Median
Labor earnings
Data 4.7 27.6 0.59 + 49.4 + 83.3
Benchmark model 0.3 22.0 0.61 + 33.8 + 86.5
Reduced model 0.3 19.9 0.59 + 23.9 + 87.7
Total income
Data 11.7 27.0 0.50 + 26.8 + 15.6
Benchmark model 13.6 18.6 0.44 + 17.7 + 59.3
Reduced model 15.5 16.2 0.40 + 8.3 + 46.3
Wealth
Data 1.8 43.6 0.72 + 33.5 + 50.2
Benchmark model 3.9 25.0 0.61 + 16.9 + 66.7
Reduced model 5.2 21.2 0.56   20.5   2.6
many households accumulating extreme levels of wealth and, hence, having large incomes
from capital gains. The lower tail of the wealth distribution is accounted for fairly well: in
the benchmark economy the poorest 40 % households hold 3.9 percent of total wealth as
opposed to the empirical value of 1.8 percent. Allowing for a positive borrowing limit could
potentially explain the dierence since there is a signicant fraction of U.S. households holding
negative net worth.
How well can the benchmark economy account for per-capita dierences between married and
single people? As can be seen in the last two columns in Table 5, the model successfully
generates a positive divergence in means and medians for all three variables of interest. In the
benchmark economy, married individuals earn on average 33.8 percent more labor income,
their average total income is 17.7 percent higher, and they hold 16.6 percent more assets than
singles. The corresponding per-capita gaps in median values are even more pronounced. For
instance, the median married individual in the model is more than 66 percent richer than
the median single individual. As for labor earnings the discrepancy in medians is particularly
large and almost matches the value from the data, even though this statistic may be partially
inuenced by the fact that more than one third of all households have by assumption zero
labor income. Altogether, the model matches the qualitative relations and mean and median
gaps fairly well. Perhaps the only exception is the gap in median income, where the model
predicts a signicantly larger disparity than in means. A possible explanation is that the
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model abstracts from other sources of income { such as private and public transfers { that
could have a mitigating eect on cross-sectional inequality.
How do these results compare to the implications of a standard incomplete-markets framework
that lacks some features introduced in the benchmark model? Specically, what is the role
played by permanent skills, assortative matching, dierences in eective taxation and directed
bequests? To answer this question, I deactivate these features and solve a reduced version
of the model (a precise description will be provided in the next section). As can be seen in
Table 5, the reduced model performs considerably worse at accounting for the data in almost
all dimensions. Importantly, per-capita dierences in average earnings and income between
married and single individuals are substantially lower than in the benchmark framework.
Also, the reduced model fails entirely to generate a positive wealth gap { on the contrary, it
counterfactually predicts that married individuals are on average more than 20 percent poorer
than singles. In other words, the reduced model is not capable of explaining a household saving
behavior that is consistent with the data, because it fails along one of the most important
dimensions, namely the role of the marital status.
It is important to note that the reduced model closely resembles standard general equilibrium
theories of inequality in a life-cycle setting (e.g. Casta~ neda et al. (2003) and De Nardi (2004)).
While some of these models do a better job of matching the bottom and top tails of the
income and wealth distribution, most of them abstract from the distinction between singles
and couples and, hence, cannot be tested along this key dimension. The virtue of the reduced
model is to show that augmenting a standard model in the most straightforward way, i.e. by
introducing two household types, leads to counterfactual predictions. The benchmark model
does a signicantly better job of explaining the emergence of a positive per-capita wealth and
income gap. Hence, it is natural to ask: which of its additional features are crucial and how
do they contribute to the overall performance of the model?
2.5.2 Counterfactuals: A closer look at per-capita dierences
In an attempt to shed more light on this question, I simulate a series of alternative models and
compare their predictions for per-capita dierences in earnings, income and wealth. The main
objective is to evaluate the relative importance of three factors that distinguish the benchmark
model from the reduced model: (i) the distinction between intentional and accidental bequests;
(ii) the tax bonus for married households; and (iii) the role of education in conjunction with
positive assortative mating. Starting from the benchmark model, I shut these three channels
down one by one and recalibrate each model appropriately. The reduced model then refers to
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clusion of eective taxation (+6 percentage points) further contributes signicantly to closing
this gap. The intuition is that lower taxes imply a higher permanent income; consequently,
married households accumulate more assets to target their wealth-to-permanent-income ratio.
Finally, activating intentional bequests for households with descendants closes the wealth gap
by another 13 percentage points. Stronger intergenerational ties among family households
provide an additional incentive to save in order to transmit the household estate to the next
generation.
Most of these observations for per-capita dierences in means carry over to per-capita dif-
ferences in medians. The benchmark model does a particularly good job in matching the
empirical value for wealth. Note that a decomposition into the contributions of each of the
three channels yields roughly equivalent numbers as in the previous analysis. Results for labor
earnings are harder to interpret, because they are considerably inuenced by the fact that a
large share of the population has zero earnings. As for median income, all models somewhat
fail to account for the empirical value. A potential explanation for this fact is that there may
be other sources of income missing in the model economies.
To summarize, the ndings in this section suggest that a standard incomplete-markets life-
cycle model fails to account for the disparity in earnings and income. Even more importantly,
it fails to account for the disparity in wealth, because it counterfactually predicts that single
individuals are richer. The intuition is that married households share labor income risk
eciently, which leads them to save less for precautionary reasons.23 The benchmark model
does a signicantly better job of matching the data. A comparison of various models shows
that introducing permanent abilities is crucial to correctly account for per-capita dierences in
earnings and income. As for wealth, the tax bonus for married households and the distinction
between intentional and accidental bequests both help to further close the gap to the data.
2.5.3 Intentional vs. accidental bequests
A novel feature of the theory put forward in this paper is the explicit distinction between
voluntary and involuntary bequests. The idea is that households with descendants have a
stronger propensity to leave their estates to future generations. In the model and my calibra-
tion, I have made the simplifying assumption that only parents of children enjoy bequeathing
their assets upon death, whereas individuals with no children do not care about bequests. The
purpose of this section is to address the validity of this assumption in light of some empirical
23The lower is the cross-spousal correlation of temporary shocks, the stronger is this eect. For instance, if
the correlation was 0 instead of 0.15, the gap to the data would widen by another half a percentage point.
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Table 7. Net worth by number of children
Fraction (in %) Mean ($) Median ($)
Married Households
No children 10.7 446,700 155,000
At least 1 child 89.3 564,200 197,400
1 child 12.6 481,000 204,300
2 children 30.2 611,900 236,400
3 children 20.8 676,900 241,200
4+ children 25.6 555,600 171,700
Single Households
No children 30.7 206,000 55,000
At least 1 child 69.3 206,800 64,400
1 child 14.6 197,400 51,100
2 children 24.7 234,300 88,400
3 children 13.5 202,500 76,100
4+ children 16.5 198,400 56,100
Source: 2007 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
evidence. Also, I will discuss how the specication of the bequest function aects my results.
One of the model's implications is that households with descendants save more than house-
holds without descendants. Do we see something similar in the data? Table 7 presents
descriptive statistics for net worth subdivided into the number of children for single and mar-
ried households. As mentioned in the calibration part, the share of single households without
children is higher than the share of married households without children. A closer look at
the table reveals that mean and median wealth across married households are both increasing
in the number of children. The exception is the last line: married households with four or
more children are poorer than those with fewer children. Single households with two children
appear to be signicantly better o, on average, than those without children; apart from this
relation, the picture is less clear. If one aggregates over households with and without children,
there is a positive relationship between the presence of a descendant and net worth.
How do these gures compare to the predictions of the model? In the benchmark economy,
married households with descendants hold on average 23.5 percent more assets than married
households without descendants. The corresponding value from the data is 26.3 percent. A
comparison of median wealth yields a gap of 22.6 percent in the model as opposed to an
empirical value of 27.4 percent. Hence, the model does a fairly good job of accounting for the
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Table 8. Policy reform: Joint vs. separate tax ling
K L Y Gini Earn Inc Wealth Welfare
Joint ling 1:38 0:251 0:464 0:61 + 33:8 + 17:7 + 16:9 {
Separate ling 1:36 0:247 0:457 0:62 + 36:4 + 18:9 + 30:7 + 8:5%
Note:  refers to the ratio of per-capita means as dened in (1). The Gini coecient is computed for wealth.
pattern observed across married households. For single households the match is not as good:
the median household with descendants holds 23.1 percent more wealth than the median
household without descendants, and the corresponding dierence in averages is 20.3 percent.
This suggests that the bequest function specied for single households is not entirely capable
of generating a saving pattern that is in accordance with the data. Alternatively, one could
employ a more sophisticated calibration that discriminates probabilities of being assigned
descendants across dierent education levels.
Overall, the ndings in this section give rise to the notion that there may be an empirical
justication for a distinction between accidental and intentional bequests { obviously, with-
out proving causality. The bequest function chosen in the model has a straightforward and
intuitive interpretation, because it relies on the assumption of full altruism across generations
instead of an arbitrary functional form. Moreover, the pooling of assets across deceased single
parents constitutes a novel way of modeling the transmission of wealth across generations.
Quantitatively, this assumption ensures that the marginal value of bequeathing one unit of
capital is of a similar magnitude as for married households.24
2.5.4 Policy experiment: Separate tax ling
An important implication of my ndings so far is that married households benet signi-
cantly from the bonus incorporated in the U.S. tax code. The reason is that married couples
face considerably lower eective tax rates than two singles with the same characteristics, in
particular, if individual incomes are very dierent. One of my counterfactual experiments
has indicated that an upward-shift of eective tax rates for married households would drive
down the per-capita wealth gap by about 6 percentage points (cf. Section 4.2). This section
24Consider an alternative specication under which individuals left their estate one-by-one to descendants.
Then an additional unit of capital left by a single would fully capitalize into the endowment of the descendant.
By contrast, an additional unit left by a married household would capitalize only as half a unit into the
endowment of each of the two descendants. Under this specication the marginal bequest value would be much
higher for singles.
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addresses the same issue in a more direct way by asking: what are the implications of a policy
reform that abolishes the possibility to le taxes jointly? I evaluate this question in the con-
text of a slightly modied version of my benchmark economy. The principle modication is
that all agents, single or married, are now subject to the same eective tax schedule. Speci-
cally, I assume that married individuals face the singles' tax function (S), where income from
capital gains is split equally between the two spouses. Any additional tax revenues resulting
from this reform are then redistributed in the form of lump-sum transfers to all agents in the
economy. For simplicity, I will focus on long-run eects and leave transitional dynamics aside.
Table 8 contrasts a selection of aggregate variables before and after the reform. The striking
result of this exercise is that moving from joint to separate ling does not diminish economic
inequality between single and married households; instead, per-capita disparities of earnings,
income and wealth widen even more. This nding seems to stand in stark contrast to the
counterfactual analysis carried out earlier. What is the intuition behind this result? Figure 1
shows that simply shifting up the tax schedule for married households yields a curve that still
looks quite dierent from the tax function for singles. Importantly, the latter implies signif-
icantly higher tax rates for low income values. This means that married households cannot
rely on favorable taxation when hit by adverse shocks; they are forced to save considerably
more for precautionary reasons.
In the new stationary equilibrium, separate tax ling generates more total tax revenue. Lump-
sum transfers induce agents to work less hours. Aggregate labor and aggregate capital are
lower than before the reform, and total output decreases by 1.5 %. Moreover, the decrease
in hours worked diers substantially by marital status (not shown): while single agents work
3.5 % less, married individuals work only 1.5 % less. This result is due to a combination of
two forces. On the one hand, secondary earners face lower eective tax rates on labor income
than under joint ling. On the other hand, there is an additional wealth eect, because higher
taxation makes married households poorer. The model predicts that the reform leads to large
welfare gains: expected welfare measured in consumption equivalents for a newborn increases
by 8.5 %. The underlying force is a scal redistribution from married to single households.
While inequality in terms of per-capita earnings and wealth appears to widen, consumption
inequality actually decreases.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
The model economy I present in this paper is largely successful at accounting for the em-
pirical distributions of earnings, income and wealth across single and married households in
the United States. One virtue of my benchmark model is that it is based on the standard
incomplete-markets framework with idiosyncratic risk, which has proven to yield fairly accu-
rate predictions pertaining to cross-sectional inequality. I demonstrate, however, that in its
original version it fails in one of the key dimensions, namely the disparity in per-capita income
and wealth between single and married households. In order to reconcile the model with the
data, I propose several extensions and evaluate their relative contribution to the performance
of the model. Moreover, I use my model to simulate the implications of abolishing joint tax
ling for married couples.
To conclude, this paper should be considered as an intermediate step towards a rened under-
standing of the interaction between marriage and economic inequality. The model has various
limitations that are worth exploring in future research. For instance, endogenizing marriage
formation and destruction could help to account for the unexplained remainder of the wealth
gap: if poor singles have a harder time to nd a spouse than rich singles, and adverse la-
bor market shocks lead to divorces, it is to be expected that the predicted wealth disparity
increases even further. Another natural extension would be to introduce economies of scale
in two-person households, for instance, by means of a public good. A careful quantitative
analysis would, however, be complicated by the fact that there is yet no empirical consen-
sus on the magnitude of such scale economies within the household. Finally, this paper has
indicated important implications for policy design. It could be interesting to study policies
that acknowledge the demand for redistribution by targeting single and married households
in dierent ways.
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2.7 Appendix I: Data Sources and Variable Denitions
2.7.1 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
The analysis is based upon the 2007 wave of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The
SCF is conducted in three-year intervals and gathers detailed information on the nancial
situation of families in the United States. The survey is designed to obtain a suciently large
and unbiased sample of wealthy households and provides appropriate weighting schemes to
adjust for nonrespondents. The primary unit of observation is the household. A household
comprises either an economically dominant single individual or a couple (married or living as
partners) as well as all other individuals in the household who are nancially interdependent
with that individual or couple. I classify a household as married if the head of the household
is legally married (and not separated), where I follow the SCF convention of dening the
head as the male in core couple households. The following two restrictions are applied on
the basic sample. First, I exclude all households where the head is less than 25 years old.
Second, I exclude the richest 1 percent of married households and the richest 1 percent of
single households. The remaining sample consists of 3,580 households; 2,366 of them are
classied as married and 1,232 as single. I employ the following variable denitions:
Labor earnings. Wages + salaries plus two 66 % of business + self-employment income.
Total income. Sum of all income sources before taxes, i.e. wage income, self-employment
income, net asset income, and private and public transfers.
Wealth. Net worth of the household, i.e. value of real and nancial assets net of liabilities.
College education. Individual has obtained a college degree (variables x5904 and x6104).
2.7.2 Current Population Survey (CPS)
The analysis is based upon the March 2010 Supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS). The CPS is the primary source of labor force statistics in the United States. A rep-
resentative sample of currently around 60,000 households is interviewed about a set of demo-
graphic and labor force questions at a monthly frequency. The Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (or `March Supplement') augments the basic survey by a set of more detailed
questions on income and is extended by an additional sample of around 34,5000 households.
I choose the family as the basic unit of observation and henceforth refer to it as a household
interchangeably.25 As a measure of preliminary data cleaning, I drop all households in which
25The primary unit of observation in the CPS is the \housing unit", which may include multiple families.
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/321622.7. APPENDIX I: DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 81
there is at least one individual whose hourly wage is lower than half of the federal minimum
wage in 2009. In addition, I exclude all households where the head is less than 25 years old.
The remaining sample consists of 190,200 individuals organized in 77,368 households.
Next, I divide the main sample into two subsamples and call them married households and
single households. A household is dened to be married if its head is currently married, and
single otherwise. The denition of the household head can be described as follows. I rst
check whether there is an individual in the family that is of working age, i.e. between 25
and 60 years old. If so, the head is dened to be the oldest male person of working age or,
alternatively, the oldest female person of working age in case there is no working-age male. If
there are no individuals of working age in the household, I dene the household head to be
the oldest adult male (i.e.  18 years). If there are no adult males in the household, the head
is dened to be the oldest adult female.
As a result, the subsample of married households consists of 126,165 individuals organized
in 38,593 households. The subsample of single households consists of 64,035 individuals or-
ganized in 38,775 households. Labor earnings and total income are dened as for the SCF,
where for both variables, respectively, I trim the data by excluding the bottom 0.5 percent of
observations in order to deal with the problem of underreporting. Other variables are dened
as follows:
Wage. To obtain an individual's hourly wage rate, I divide annual labor earnings by annual
hours worked. Annual hours worked are computed as the product of the number of weeks
worked and the number of hours worked per week (items 'wkswork' and 'hrswk').
Gender premium. I consider all working-age individuals who participate in the labor force,
i.e. who work at least 260 annual hours (this corresponds to an average of 1 hour per working
day). This sample consists of 74,792 individuals. The gender premium is computed as the
ratio between the average wage rate earned by females and the average wage rate earned by
males.
College: Individuals are dened to be college-educated if they have obtained some college
degree (value of 41+ in item 'a-hga'). To compute the college premium I consider the same
sample that is used to compute the gender premium, and I calculate the ratio between the
average wage rate earned by college-educated individuals and the average wage rate earned
by non-college educated individuals. To partly control for the gender gap, I do this separately
for both genders and then take the average.
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2.8 Appendix II
2.8.1 Population ows
Denote by nM, nf and nm the respective measures of married, single female and single male
households in the population, where the total population size is normalized to nM+nf+nm =
1. Recall that married households die together and that the probability of dying is equal
across retired single households of both genders. These assumptions imply that nf = nm.
Denote by ni
W and ni
R the measures of working-age and retired households for each household
type i 2 fM;f;mg, where by denition ni
W + ni
R = ni. Population ows between dierent
household types can then be described as follows:
Retired married households   Inow: R (1    ) nM
W
Retired married households   Outow: D nM
R + (1   D)   nM
R
Working-age married households   Inow: newborn married
Working-age married households   Outow: R nM
W + (1   R)   nM
W
Retired single households   Inow: R n
g
W +   (1   D)nM
R +   RnM
W
Retired single households   Outow: D n
g
R
Working-age single households   Inow: (1   R)   nM
W + newborn singles
Working-age single households   Outow: R n
g
W
where g = f;m. For example, the measure of married households owing out of retirement
after each period is equal to the sum of two masses: the measure of households who die at
the end of the period, D nM
R , and the measure of households who survive but divorce at the
end of the period, (1   D)   nM
R . The measures of newborn single and married households
will be described in more detail below.
It is important to note that in an equilibrium with stationary population measures inows
and outows for each household type have to exactly oset each other. For instance, consider
the measure of retired married households. Equalizing the rst two expressions and using
nM




R (1    )
D + (1   D)   + R (1    )
 nM:




Rnf + (1   D)   nM
R + R   nM
W
D + R :
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To derive the measures of newborn households, note that the mass of households dying at






 n. This implies that the total mass of
newborn households is equal to n. The share of newborn married households is determined by






i  q, where q
g
i is the probability that an individual of gender g is born with ability
level i, and q represents the unconditional probability of being matched. It is then easy to
show that the measure of newborn married households in each period is equal to nq=(2 q).
Equivalently, the measure of newborn single households is equal to 2 n(1   q)=(2   q), where
half of them are single females and the other half single males.
2.8.2 Calibration of demographic parameters








c;c and   given predetermined values
for R, D, q
f
c and qm
c and ve empirical moments: the population shares of married couples
with all four educational combinations and the share of marriages that lead to a divorce.
First, note that the unconditional probability for a married working-age couple to be hit by
a separation shock before dying is given by (1    )
1
R + 1
D . For any combination of R and
D, the single-period divorce probability   then determines the targeted life-time divorce
probability.
To pin down the matching probabilities, recall from the previous subsection that the measure
of newborn married households owing into working age is given by nq=(2 q). In a stationary
equilibrium this number has to equal the corresponding outow:
n q=(2   q) =
h










Plug in the expression for nM
R as derived above:
n q=(2   q) =
h
R + (1   R)  
i h
nM  
R (1    )
D + (1   D)   + R (1    )
 nM
i
n q=(2   q) =
h
R + (1   R)  
i h D + (1   D)  
D + (1   D)   + R (1    )
i
nM:
Given the overall share of married households nM, which is simply the sum of the empirical
population shares of married couples with all four educational combinations, one can solve
this expression for q, the unconditional probability of being matched. Given q, it is then









c based on q
f
c and the relative frequencies of the four educational combinations across
married households in the data.
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2.9 Appendix III: The Bequest Function
The bequest motive for single and married agents is closely linked to the expected value
function for a newborn individual, which I denote as W. Based on the likelihood to be
selected into gender, education and household type respectively, and given that the initial
time-varying labor eciency component z is drawn from a Normal distribution through ,































where V g(a;s) is the value function of a single agents of gender g as dened in (2.3.6), and
e V g(a;s) is the value function of a married agent of gender g. Note that e V g(a;s) is implicitly
dened by the collective household's Pareto problem and can be computed accordingly.
The bequest function for married households with descendants, Z (a0;1), can now be derived
as follows. Since there is no intergenerational transmission of abilities, the bequest motive
does not depend on individual labor eciencies and is, thus, identical for both agents in the







The bequest function for single agents is slightly more involved, because they pool their estates
with a randomly selected single agent of opposite gender. Since they do not know the quantity
of assets contributed by the other parent before dying, they form rational expectations based
on the actual distribution of assets in the population. Denote by g the measure of single












(a0 + aP(a;sm;1)) =2

dm;
where I have renamed the policy function of single male agents to aP(a;sm;1) in order to












(a0 + aP(a;sf;1)) =2

df:
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On the Implications of
Intrahousehold Risk Sharing for
Unemployment Insurance
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; Intrahousehold Risk Sharing; Gender-Based Taxation.
JEL Classication Numbers: D13; E21; E62; I38; J65.
3.1 Introduction
Unemployment benet programs are often motivated on the grounds of providing insurance
against idiosyncratic income uctuations. When lump-sum taxation is not available and
private capital markets are incomplete, the welfare-maximizing government faces a trade-o
between public risk sharing through redistribution on the one hand, and eciency losses due
to distortionary taxation on the other hand. This trade-o has been the subject of many
recent studies.1 An aspect that has mostly been overlooked in the literature, however, is how
the optimal provision of social insurance is shaped by informal sources of private insurance,
the most important one being the family. If individuals are able to share part of their income
risk with family members, for instance in households with multiple breadwinners, the demand
for public insurance may be reduced. At the same time, the design of unemployment benet
schedules can have an inuence on intrahousehold risk-sharing agreements themselves, for
1See, e.g., Attanasio and R os-Rull (2000), Thomas and Worrall (2007), Heathcote (2005), Kocherlakota
(2006), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), and Kr uger and Perri (2010).
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instance, if they aect the balance of power within families. In that case, taxation and the
provision of benets may even lead to unforeseen eects, depending on how policy distorts
the allocation that family members bargain upon.
In this paper, these arguments are formalized in an incomplete-markets model with uninsur-
able, idiosyncratic employment shocks. The focus of the paper lies on the interaction between
public unemployment insurance and private intrahousehold insurance. I choose to contrast
two polar economies: on the one hand, an economy in which individuals can rely on ecient
risk sharing within the household, and, on the other hand, an economy in which they cannot.
The rst economy is populated by a large number of two-person households, each pooling risk
and making collective decisions on individual consumptions, labor supplies and joint savings
in a risk-free asset, subject to a borrowing constraint. The two persons forming a house-
hold, a female and a male, are assumed to have dierent individual preferences for risk and
dierent elasticities of labor supply. In the second economy, by contrast, individuals form
single-person households and, thus, lack access to family insurance. The latter framework is
a version of the standard Aiyagari-Bewley-Huggett model which has been studied extensively
in this literature.
Equipped with these two model economies, I wish to investigate how the provision of public
unemployment insurance intertwines with private insurance mechanisms. To this end, I cali-
brate the model economies to U.S. data and simulate a series of policy reforms that alter the
current public insurance scheme. For any policy reform, I compute the stationary equilib-
rium that would arise after implementing it in either economy. Upon comparing implications
for allocations and welfare, I can characterize the role of intrahousehold risk sharing for un-
employment insurance. A further contribution of my analysis is to study policies targeting
females and male in distinct ways. For instance, I can assess whether there are eciency
arguments for unconventional schemes such as gender-based taxation2 or wage subsidies.
My main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, reducing the generosity of unemploy-
ment benets leads to welfare gains in both model economies. This suggests that private
forms of insurance seem to work suciently well to justify less distortionary taxation { even
if insurance from the family is not available. Second, the two models have very dierent
predictions about who realizes those welfare gains. If intrafamily risk sharing is available, the
collective bargaining agreement induces females to work more hours since they supply labor
more elastically. As a result, they suer welfare losses and all eciency gains are realized by
males. By contrast, the model without intrafamily insurance predicts that females are better-
2This idea has been put forward recently by Alesina et al. (2011).
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o. Since males hold more capital, they suer welfare losses { the reason is that lower public
insurance implies more precautionary saving which, in turn, depresses returns on capital.
In a further experiment, I evaluate the implications of a revenue-neutral reform that pre-
scribes dierent replacement rates for females and males. My ndings indicate that higher
replacement rates for males { at the expense of lower replacement rates for females { can have
welfare-improving eects in an economy where intrahousehold risk sharing is available. The
intuition is that household income uctuates to a larger extent if males are hit by an unem-
ployment shock than if females are unemployed. As a result, smoothing household income
by means of more generous male replacement rates benets females and males at the same
time. The model also predicts aggregate welfare gains even if intrahousehold risk sharing is
not available.
Are there eciency grounds for taxing female and male labor income at dierent rates? I nd
that this is indeed the case. Shifting the tax burden from the high-elasticity good (female
labor) to the low-elasticity good (male labor) reduces distortions and raises aggregate welfare.
This result holds independently of whether individuals can share risk within the household
or not. Interestingly, subsidizing female labor supply may actually lead to welfare losses
for females themselves if they are bound to family insurance: when female market hours
become relatively more productive, the collective household allocates more labor supply to
women, a pattern that is additionally amplied by a large labor elasticity. For instance, if the
government lowers the tax rate on female labor by 3 percentage points, females would work
on average 3 % more hours, whereas males would decrease their market work by only 0.9 %.
The study most closely related to this one is Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002). These authors
investigate potential crowding-out eects of unemployment benets on intrafamily insurance.
Their model features families consisting of a number of self-interested individuals who share
labor income risk through informal contracts with limited commitment. Defecting from a
contract leads to exclusion from future risk-sharing arrangements within the family. Di Tella
and MacCulloch (2002) show that in their model more generous public transfers can lead
to a more than one-by-one reduction in intrafamily insurance. The reason is that exclusion
from intrafamily risk sharing becomes relatively more attractive, which reduces the set of
incentive-compatible contracts. The main dierence to their paper is that I do not investigate
the issue of limited commitment and moral hazard within the household. Instead, I focus on
the distinct implications public transfers can have depending on whether intrafamily contracts
are actually available or not.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The two model environments are presented
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in Section 2, and Section 3 summarizes the calibration strategy. In Section 4, I describe the
results of my numerical experiments. Section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
3.2 The Model
Consumers. Consider an economy that is populated by a continuum of innitely-lived
consumers/workers. Half of them will be referred to as females, and the other half as males.
All individuals enjoy the consumption of an aggregate good and of leisure time. Agents supply
time to work in the production sector and face idiosyncratic labor market risk in the form
of employment shocks. Employment shocks, s, take on values in S  f0;1g and follow a
Markov chain with transition matrix i, where superscript i denotes the gender: females (f)
and males (m). Thus, i
s0js is the probability for an agent of gender i to receive employment




s0js = 1, i
s0js > 0, and i
1j1  i
1j0 for i = f;m. The long-run probabilities of
the two employment shocks in S are denoted by qi
0 and qi
1. There are no others shocks in the
economy.
Markets are incomplete. The only asset in the economy is physical capital, which pays out the
risk-free interest rate r. Moreover, I assume that individuals in this economy are not allowed
to borrow. This imposes a zero lower bound on their asset holdings. Lifetime preferences for




tUi(ct;lt); for i = f;m; (3.2.1)
where ct denotes consumption, lt is leisure and  denotes the discount factor. I will assume
that Ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each of its arguments, twice continuously
dierentiable and satises the Inada conditions.
Firms. Production of the aggregate good is conducted by a continuum of competitive rms.
The representative rm operates a technology that can be represented by the Cobb-Douglas
production function F(K;L) = KL1 , where K is the aggregate stock of capital, L is
aggregate labor and 0 <  < 1 is the capital's share of income. Female and male labor are
assumed to be perfect substitutes, L  Lm + (1   )Lf, where  is a parameter that pins
down relative productivities and can thus be used to model the gender gap in wages. The
depreciation rate of capital is denoted by 0 <  < 1. The rm's maximization problem is
static: given a rental price of capital r and gross wages for females and males  wf and  wm,
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respectively, rst-order conditions are:
FK(K;L) = r +  (3.2.2)
FL(K;L) =  wm (3.2.3)
(1   )FL(K;L) =  wf: (3.2.4)
Government. There is a government that provides public insurance against unemployment
shocks. The government pays out benets bi to unemployed workers of gender i = f;m.
Only workers who receive an unemployment shock are entitled to benet payments. The
government nances its expenditures by levying linear taxes on labor income: given tax rates
i, I will denote after-tax wage rates by wi = (1   i)  wi. The government is required to
balance its budget on a period-by-period basis.
3.2.1 The Bachelor Model
I now consider two dierent risk-sharing arrangements and study their implications for public
unemployment insurance. Each arrangement denes in turn a dierent type of household. I
start out by presenting the problem of the bachelor household. The dening feature of this
type of household is that a single breadwinner chooses sequences of consumption, leisure and
asset holdings in order to maximize his/her own lifetime utility. A household formed by a











s.t. c + a0 = wi(1   l)s + (1   s) bi + (1 + r)a
c  0; 0  l  1; and a0 2 [0; a];
where i
s0js are the elements of i.3. By construction, the bachelor household does not engage
in informal insurance arrangements with other workers. The only sources of insurance avail-
able to this type of household are the public unemployment insurance system, own savings
and own labor supply.
3.2.2 The Collective Model
The second risk-sharing arrangement I consider is the two-person collective household, which
is formed by an egotistical female and an egotistical male. I assume that the two members
3For the sake of notational brevity, I omit the dependence on prices r and w
i in an individual's value
function.
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of the household share labor market risk in such a way that intrahousehold allocations are
ecient. Following the literature of collective households (see Chiappori and Donni 2010 for
a recent survey), the utility of each individual in the household carries a weight, reecting
the relative power of that individual in the household. Individual weights are assumed to
depend on variables such as premarital wealth, the population sex ratio, relative earnings and
government policy. Under full commitment, that is, when household members can commit
to future intrahousehold allocations, individual weights are set when the household is formed
and remain unchanged thereafter. Thus, transitory shocks, which are small relative to lifetime
income, have no eect on individual weights. Only variables known or predicted at the time
of household formation can aect those weights. In my model there are four sources of
earning dierences between females and males that aect relative Pareto weights: 1) They
have dierent gross wages; 2) They may pay dierent tax rates; 3) They may receive dierent
levels of unemployment benets; and, 4) Finally, females and males may be subject to dierent
employment and unemployment spells. I write the Pareto weight on female's utility as (x;) 2
(0;1), where function  is assumed to be dierentiable with respect to its rst argument.












i for j = f;m and i = 0;1 is, as written above, the long-run probability of employment
state i for an agent of gender j. It must be noted that in this model the Pareto weight function,
(x), is not obtained as the outcome of an explicit bargaining process between females and
males. Instead, I will use estimates of the sharing rule provided by Browning, Bourguignon,
Chiappori and Lechene (1994) to parameterize and solve the model.
Household-level state variables for the two-person, collective household are the vector of em-
ployment shocks s = (sf;sm), which I assume to be uncorrelated within the household, and
the level of asset holdings, a.4 The state space of a household is X = S  S  [0; a]. I denote
by B the Borel sigma algebra of X. The transition matrix for s is denoted by  and obtained
from the individual transition matrices as  = m 
 f. The maximization problem of a
4See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for an empirical justication of the assumption of uncorrelated shocks.
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collective household with Pareto weight (x) reads
V (s;a;x) = max
cf;cm;lf;lm;a0
(






cf + cm + a0 =
X
i=f;m
wi(1   li)si +
X
i=f;m
(1   si) bi + (1 + r)a (3.2.7)
cf; cm  0; 0  lf; lm  1; and a0 2 [0; a];
where s0js are the elements of . Note that while I allow for dierent preferences over
consumption and leisure for females and males, I assume that both spouses share a common
discount factor . Contrary to unitary models of the household, the utility function of the
collective household depends, via the Pareto weight, on wages and policy variables, which
leads to household demands that fail to meet the Slutsky conditions. This failure is the
dening feature of the collective model. Also, while in unitary models household decisions do
not depend on who receives the income within the household, in the collective model decisions
depend on total income as well as on who receives the income (whether it is the female or the
male).
3.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets
I now dene a stationary equilibrium with incomplete markets in the collective household
economy. Let  (B;) be a probability measure describing the mass of households with xed
Pareto weight  at each point in the state space X, where  (B;) is dened on the Borel
sigma algebra B. Denote by P(s;a;B;) the probability that a household with Pareto weight
 at state (s;a) will transit to a state that lies in B 2 B in the next period. The transition





where I is an indicator function taking on a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise,
and Bs and Ba are the projections of B on S  S and [a;a] respectively. Note that these
transition functions will in general dier across households with dierent Pareto weights . I
am now ready to dene the equilibrium concept for the model.
Denition: A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets in the




measure of households   and a set of prices

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1) For given prices, taxes and benets, V is the solution to (3.2.7), and cf(s;a;), cm(s;a;),
lf(s;a;mu);lm(s;a;) and a0(s;a;) are the associated optimal policy functions.
2) For given prices, K, Lf and Lm satisfy the rm's rst-order conditions (3.2.2) { (3.2.4).


















sm[1   lm(s;a;)]d dG: (3.2.10)





P(s;a;B;)d  for all B 2 B: (3.2.11)
5) The government budget is balanced: q
f
0bf + qm
0 bm = f  wfLf + m  wmLm.
3.3 Parameterization and Calibration
3.3.1 Parameterization










1   i for i = f;m; (3.3.1)
where 'i
c and 'i
l are parameters ('
f
c is normalized to one) and i is the coecient of relative
risk aversion of an individual of gender i. It must be noted that in the model with collective
households |and contrary to the model with bachelor households| the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply of an individual of gender i depends not only on parameter i, but is also a func-
tion of variables and parameters that aect the expected, intrahousehold earnings dierential
through the Pareto weight.5
Technology. As written above, the production takes place according to the standard Cobb-
Douglas technology, F(K;L) = KL1 , where labor is L  Lm + (1   )Lf. Parameter 
is the capital share of income and  pins down relative gross wages, since wf=wm = (1 )=.
5See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for a derivation of Frisch elasticities in the collective household economy.
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Pareto weights. Since all households are ex-ante identical, they have the same relative
Pareto weight. For my benchmark economy, I will make the simplifying assumption that
relative Pareto weights are equal to 0:5. I also need the derivative of the Pareto weight
function with respect to x, 0(x), in order to pin down the Frisch elasticities of labor supply.
I will set the value of this derivative using empirical estimates of the sharing rule. I detail
this empirical evidence and my procedure below.
3.3.2 Calibration




l ; f; m; f and m.
There are three technology parameters: ;  and . The two transition matrices f and
m contain four parameters. The public insurance program is described by tax rates and the
level of unemployment benets: f;m;bf and bm (one of the tax rates is determined from the
balanced-budget constraint). Finally, I have to pin down the derivative of the Pareto weight
function with respect to x, 1.
The length of a period in the model is set to one quarter. I normalize '
f
c to 1, which is
equivalent to dividing both instantaneous utility functions by this parameter. In order to
calibrate the remaining parameters I choose a set of statistics from aggregate and household
survey data for the U.S. economy, such that the incomplete markets equilibrium of the col-
lective household economy matches these targets. Using estimates for the quarterly capital
depreciation rate and the capital share of income, I set  = 0:025 and  = 0:36, which are
both standard values in the macro literature. In my benchmark economy, I impose equal labor
income tax rates for females and males, f = m. Consequently, the value for  can be pinned
down using a priori information on the gender wage gap. I set this parameter equal to 0:575,
which implies a ratio of female to male wages of 0:74. This corresponds to the gender wage
gap in 2004 as reported by Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2010) for the U.S. economy.
Transition probabilities for idiosyncratic employment shocks are assumed to be identical for
females and males. I use the following transition probabilities which match an average em-






for i = f;m: (3.3.2)
The remaining twelve parameters are set such that the model matches the following targets:
1. Married females' average hours of work if working represent 28% of their discretionary
Nawid Siassi (2011), Intrahousehold Insurance and its Implications for Macroeconomic Outcomes 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/3216298 CHAPTER 3. ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTRAHOUSEHOLD [...]
time. Married males' average hours of work if working represent 40% of their discre-
tionary time.6
2. Estimates for males' Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the presence of potentially
binding borrowing constraints range from 0.2 to 0.6 (see Domeij and Flod en 2006).
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) nd that for females this elasticity is 3-4 times larger
than for males. I will target values of 0.37 and 1.2 for males and females, respectively.
3. Non-gender-based estimates of the average coecient of relative risk aversion have
yielded values ranging from 1 to 10. When gender is taken into account, females are
found to be more risk-averse than males.7 I set individual preferences for risk at f = 2
and m = 1:5, which yield an average coecient of relative risk aversion for the collective
household of 1:68.
4. The capital-to-output ratio is around 10.
5. The ratio of annual hours worked by single working women to annual hours worked
by single working men is 1861=2095 = 89 percent.8 I will match this value using the
equilibrium of the bachelor economy.
6. The average net unemployment benet replacement rate in the United States is roughly
30 percent (see OECD 2010). I will set bf and bm to match this target as fractions of
the average wage income both for females and males. Labor income tax rates are set to
balance the budget constraint of the government.
7. The derivative of the Pareto weight function with respect to the expected income dif-
ferential, 1, is set to match the sharing rule estimates presented in Browning, Bour-
guignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994).9
Table 1 presents parameter values for my benchmark economy.
6Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008) use PSID data from 1968 to 1996 to compute mean annual hours
worked if working for married females and males; he nds values of 1660 and 2312 respectively. I assume that
the disposable daily time endowment is 16 hours.
7For a recent study of risk aversion and gender see Maestripieri, Sapienza and Zingales (2009), who nd a
negative relation between testosterone levels and risk aversion.
8See Mazzocco, Ruiz and Yamaguchi (2008).
9See Ortigueira and Siassi (2010) for further explanation.
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Table 1. Baseline Parameters
Description Parameter Value Description Parameter Value
Female risk aversion f 2 Utility weight 'f
c 1
Male risk aversion m 1:5 Utility weight 'm
c 2:15
Regulates Frisch elasticity f 2 Utility weight '
f
l 2:662
Regulates Frisch elasticity m 3:75 Utility weight 'm
l 0:911
Pareto weight  0:5 Discount factor  0:989
Derivative Pareto weight 1 0:038 Unemployment benets bf 0:083
Capital income share  0:36 Unemployment benets bm 0:161
Depreciation rate of capital  0:025 Relative wages  0:575
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Benchmark Economies
Before turning to the results of my scal policy experiments, I will briey describe the steady-
state allocations of the two benchmark economies. Table 2 summarizes aggregate variables
for the collective household economy and the bachelor household economy. Note that the two
economies dier only in the insurance opportunities available to individuals, and, therefore,
dierences in aggregates variables reect equilibrium eects of intrahousehold risk sharing.
Aggregate capital is higher in the bachelor economy, as the lack of insurance from the family
in this economy leads individuals to rely more on savings. Aggregate work eort by females
and males ranks dierently in the two economies. While male labor is higher in the collective
economy, females work more in the bachelor economy. In the bachelor economy, females
are relatively poorer and, since they lack the consumption insurance provided by the family,
must supply more hours of work. Males nance part of female consumption in the collective
economy (even with equal Pareto weights) and must therefore work longer hours. Total
labor is higher in the bachelor household economy. The capital-labor ratio is lower in the
economy with intrahousehold risk sharing, yielding a higher interest rate as compared to the
economy with bachelor households. Finally, production is higher in the economy with bachelor
households, which results from larger aggregate capital and labor.
Next, I will lay out the design of my scal policy reforms. Starting from the two benchmark
economies, I simulate a series of experiments that alter the structure of the unemployment
insurance system in distinct ways. Specically, I simulate the following policy reforms:
1. \Change replacement rate" (E1): Change the replacement rate of unemployment
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Table 2. Steady-state equilibrium: Aggregate variables
Y K L K=L Kf Km Lf Lm 100  r
Collective economy 1:272 12:682 0:349 36:335 { { 0:280 0:400 1:1115
Bachelor economy 1:308 13:041 0:359 36:345 4:724 8:326 0:336 0:375 1:1109
benets and let the labor income tax rate adjust to balance the government budget.
In this scenario replacement rates and tax rates remain equalized across females and
males.
2. \Change combination of replacement rates" (E2): Keeping the tax rate on labor
income constant, change the combination of replacement rates for females and males.
In this scenario replacement rates dier, but the tax rate remains the same for both
genders.
3. \Change combination of tax rates" (E3): Keeping the replacement rates constant,
change the combination of labor income tax rates for females and males. In this scenario
replacement rates are equalized, but tax rates are gender specic.
For each experiment and each economy, I compute the new steady-state equilibrium that
would arise after the policy reform has been put in place. When examining the impact on
aggregate variables and welfare in the two economies, I will ignore transitional dynamics and
focus on long-run eects. Moreover, I will simulate each reform for a wide range of dierent
values in order to potentially detect non-linear eects; for instance, experiments E1 and E2
are conducted for replacement rates between zero and 40 percent. Similarly, I will allow for
negative tax rates (i.e. subsidies) in experiment E3. The underlying objective is to employ
all available policy instruments in the widest possible meaningful way. Aggregate welfare is
computed using a utilitarian criterion and measured in terms of consumption equivalent units.
In addition to calculating expected welfare gains for a generic agent, I will also present welfare
eects for females and males separately.
3.4.2 Experiment 1: Change replacement rate
The rst experiment aims at quantifying the trade-o between less taxation { and thus a lower
extent to which intratemporal decisions are distorted { versus more public insurance against
uninsurable adverse shocks. Figure 1 plots aggregate welfare as a function of the replacement
rate of unemployment benets for both benchmark economies. As can be seen, both curves
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Figure 3.1: Welfare eect of changing the replacement rate (Experiment 1)
exhibit fairly similar shapes: welfare increases as the replacement rate is lowered to about
15 percent and then levels o. By contrast, raising replacement rates beyond 30 percent {
the benchmark value { unambiguously depresses welfare in both economies. This suggests
that there is relatively little scope for public insurance, because private means of insurance {
precautionary saving, adjustments to labor supply and, potentially, insurance from the family
{ work fairly well against unemployment risk. The magnitude of welfare eects is modest:
for instance, lowering the replacement rate to 15 percent would have a positive welfare eect
of 0.09 percent (measured in consumption equivalent units) in the collective economy, and of
0.07 percent in the bachelor economy.
While aggregate welfare eects look very similar in both model economies, intrahousehold
risk sharing has a very distinct impact on gender-specic welfare eects (Figure 2, upper pan-
els). Lowering replacement rates makes males considerably better o than in the benchmark
economy, but only if intrahousehold risk sharing is available. By contrast, they suer welfare
losses when living in a single household. For females the opposite is true: they benet from
lower replacement rates, but only when living alone. To gain some intuition for this result, it
is useful to look at the general equilibrium forces on factor prices (Figure 2, lower panels). If
individuals must rely less on public insurance, precautionary saving as one means of private
insurance increases. This depresses the interest rate through a higher capital supply and
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Figure 3.2: Welfare eect by gender and price eects of changing the replacement rate (E1)
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raises wage rates. Moreover, since the need to nance benets through labor income taxation
diminishes when replacement rates are lowered, net wage rates rise even further.10
In the bachelor economy, females are favored through higher returns to labor and they are less
aected by lower returns to capital, because they hold on average fewer assets than males.
Males have a larger permanent income and, hence, target a larger stock of buer savings,
which becomes relatively more costly as the wedge between the subjective time preferences
rate and the returns to capital opens up. In the economy with intrahousehold risk sharing,
from an ex-ante point of view, factor price movements aect all households in the same way.
As replacement rates are lowered and the labor wedge is reduced, the collective household
allocates more time to market work and to consumption. Females are relatively worse o,
because they supply labor more elastically and benet relatively little from more consumption;
as a result, eciency gains are realized by males.
To summarize, the rst experiment suggests that private insurance against unemployment
suces to justify less public insurance { even without intrahousehold risk sharing. Gender-
specic welfare eects, however, critically depend on the type of living arrangement.
3.4.3 Experiment 2: Change combination of replacement rates
Females and males exhibit dierent attitudes towards risk and supply labor more or less elas-
tically. Is there scope for policies addressing gender heterogeneity in preferences explicitly,
for instance, by providing dierent levels of public insurance? The second policy experiment
answers this question in the context of a scal reform that leaves the revenue side untouched
{ i.e. tax rates are kept at their benchmark value { yet discriminates the generosity of un-
employment benets across genders. Under this reform, lower replacement rates for females
imply higher replacement rates for males, and vice versa.
Figure 3 shows expected welfare gains as a function of the replacement rate for females in the
collective and in the bachelor economy. Interestingly, in both economies welfare rises as the
generosity of males' benets increases at the expense of benets for females. The magnitude
of welfare gains is substantially lower if intrahousehold risk sharing is available. For instance,
reducing the replacement rate of females' benets to 15% would imply a replacement rate
for males of 37.8% and an aggregate welfare gain of 0.01% in the collective economy. In the
bachelor economy a similar policy reform would imply a replacement rate for males of 39.5%
and an aggregate welfare gain of 0.5%. Gender-specic welfare eects, once again, look very
10Recall that female and male labor are perfect substitutes. This implies that wage changes for females and
males are proportional.
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Figure 3.3: Welfare eect of changing the replacement rate for females (Experiment 2)
dierent in the two models (Figure 4). In an economy where unemployment risk is shared
within the household, both spouses benet from a policy reform that shifts the generosity of
public insurance to males (Figure 4, upper-left panel). The intuition behind this nding is
that allocations made within the collective household do not crucially depend on the source of
unemployment benets { the impact on relative Pareto weights is too small quantitatively to
play a signicant role. Therefore, for a given level of public insurance, the collective household
prefers to smooth male income during unemployment spells at the expense of smoothing female
income, because the income loss is substantially larger if the husband is unemployed. As a
result, precautionary savings diminish and the interest rate on capital has to rise to clear the
market (Figure 4, lower-left panel).
The corresponding gures for the bachelor economy look counterintuitive at rst glance:
expected welfare for females rises in response to lowering their replacement rate, whereas males
suer welfare losses (Figure 4, upper-right panel). To explain this result, one has to bear in
mind that gender-specic welfare measures are based on the distribution of females and males
that arise in a stationary equilibrium. If males expect more insurance from unemployment
benets, they save less for precautionary reasons, while the opposite is true for females. As a
consequence, in the long run females accumulate more assets and become richer than males.11
11This result is substantially favored by the fact that capital supply in this model is very elastic. If there
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Figure 3.4: Welfare eect by gender and price eects of changing the female repl. rate (E2)
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Figure 3.5: Welfare eect of changing the tax rate for females (Experiment 3)
Therefore, computing aggregate welfare on the basis of stationary distributions somewhat
conceals the fact that, for a given level of assets, males are better o with a higher replacement
rate. It is important to note that is not a price eect: interest rates and wage rate remain
almost constant, because changes in capital supply by agents of both genders essentially oset
each other (Figure 4, lower-right panel).
3.4.4 Experiment 3: Change combination of tax rates
The third policy experiment picks up a notion that has recently attracted some attention
among labor economists { the idea of gender-based taxation. It is inspired by the Ramsey
rule, which states that, in order to minimize distortions, goods with a lower demand elasticity
should be taxed at higher rates. In the current context, lower labor income tax rates for
women at the expense of higher tax rates for men could reduce overall distortions, given that
women supply labor more elastically. For this experiment, I take the expenditure side of
my benchmark economies as given { i.e. I leave benets untouched { and only change the
composition of the revenue side.
Results are shown in Figure 5. Starting from a common tax rate of 1.86 percent (vertical
were other sources of risk, variations to unemployment insurance would have a much weaker impact on saving
patterns.
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solid line), lowering tax rates on females' labor income indeed leads to welfare gains in both
economies. Note that these welfare gains are relatively large compared to the previous ex-
periments. For instance, a negative tax rate (i.e. a subsidy) of 1.5 percent on female labor
income would raise aggregate welfare by 0.4 percent in the bachelor economy and 0.1 percent
in the collective economy. Such a reform would have to be nanced by in increase in the male
tax rate to 4.08 percent (bachelor) and 3.59 percent (collective) respectively.
Gender-specic welfare eects and net wage changes are depicted in Figure 6.12 A reduction
of tax rates on female labor income raises their net wage and lowers male net wages through
higher taxes on male labor. If no intrahousehold risk sharing is available, welfare eects are as
expected: females gain and males lose. Interestingly, this result is overturned if employment
risk is shared eciently within households. When female market hours become relatively
more productive, the collective household allocates more labor supply to women, a pattern
that is additionally amplied by a larger female labor elasticity. In the previous example of
a 1.5-percent subsidy, females would work on average 3 percent more hours, whereas males
would decrease their market work by only 0.9 percent (not shown).
Overall, these ndings suggest that shifting the tax burden from the high-elasticity good
(female labor) to the low-elasticity good (male labor) may indeed reduce distortions and raise
aggregate welfare. Yet it is important to note that such a policy of reducing the gender wage
gap would not necessarily favor females.
3.4.5 Composite policy reform
In the previous parts, I have examined the implications of single modications to the unem-
ployment insurance system in both economies. As a nal exercise, this section proposes an
exemplary policy reform that is composed of various changes to the benchmark. The objective
is to conduct a quantitative assessment of this reform in terms of important aggregate vari-
ables and welfare, and to highlight the driving forces depending on whether intrahousehold
risk sharing is available or not. Specically, the unemployment insurance system after the
reform shall be characterized as follows: (a) reduce the replacement rate to 15% and freeze
total expenditures that would be necessary to nance benets at this level; (b) decrease the
replacement rate of female benets further to 12.5% and raise the replacement rate of male
benets accordingly to keep total expenditures constant; (c) set the tax rate on female labor
income to zero and raise the tax rate on male labor income accordingly to nance benets.
12Net wage changes and price changes are only shown for the collective economy. The corresponding gures
for the bachelor economy are very similar.
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Figure 3.6: Welfare eect by gender and price eects of changing the tax rate for females (E3)
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Table 3. Composite policy reform: Change in aggregate variables (in %)
Y K L Lf Lm Wf Wm W
Collective economy + 0:40 + 0:37 + 0:42 + 1:40   0:08   0:56 + 0:54 + 0:056
Bachelor economy + 0:12 + 0:13 + 0:11   0:48 + 0:50 + 1:57   1:01 + 0:236
Table 3 summarizes the long-run implications of this policy reform mix. Aggregate capital
and aggregate labor increase independently of whether intrahousehold risk sharing is available
or not. Total output increases by 0.4 percent in the collective economy and by 0.12 percent
in the bachelor economy. When dierentiated by gender, the reform generates distinct ad-
justments in both economies. While females choose to work less in an economy with bachelor
households, they work longer hours when sharing risks with a spouse: the collective model
predicts an increase of female labor supply by almost 1.5%. Hours worked by males remain
almost unaected in the economy with intrahousehold risk sharing, whereas in the bachelor
model males choose to work longer hours. The reform mix brings about welfare gains in
both economies: measured in consumption equivalents, expected welfare goes up by 0.06%
and 0.24% respectively. Gender-specic welfare eects depend very much on risk-sharing
opportunities, though: while females draw relatively large benets from the modied unem-
ployment insurance system when living as bachelors, they suer signicant losses when living
in a collective household; the opposite is true for males.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
The main contribution of this study is to show that the trade-o between distortionary scal
policy and public risk sharing may be critically aected by informal risk sharing agreements
such as the family. Reforms to the design of the unemployment insurance system typically
have distinct implications for individual and aggregate allocations, depending on whether
intrahousehold risk sharing is available or not. It is also revealed that policies targeting in-
dividuals of one gender can lead to unexpected outcomes, if they do not acknowledge the
bargaining process between spouses. Finally, there is some evidence that gender-based taxa-
tion and replacement rates can give rise to welfare and output gains.
The framework presented in this paper involves a number of restrictions. For example, since
only unemployed workers are entitled to benets, there is no endogenous participation deci-
sion. Introducing voluntary unemployment would create an additional margin that could play
a role when comparing the collective household to the bachelor household. Since females are
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typically secondary earners in multi-person households, higher taxes and overgenerous bene-
ts could both distort incentives. A related extension worth pursuing could be to investigate
policy reforms that condition benet payments on the employment status of the spouse, if
present. Family insurance is shown to go a long way in smoothing income and consumption,
as long as either of the two breadwinners is employed. Providing additional public insurance
for the worst-case scenario, i.e. when both spouses are unemployed, at the expense of less
insurance for intermediate cases, i.e. when only one spouse is unemployed, could improve the
benet of public risk sharing without touching the taxation side.
A dierent way to proceed would be to add labor market frictions to the model. There is a
large literature studying the interaction between unemployment insurance and labor market
outcomes if workers have to search for jobs and are matched stochastically. However, very
little work has been done on how the presence of multiple persons in the household impacts
on these theories.13
13Guler, Guvenen and Violante (2009) take a rst step in that direction.
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